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ARTICLES
REDEEMING JUDICIAL REVIEW:
THE HARD LOOK DOCTRINE AND FEDERAL
REGULATORY EFFORTS TO RESTRUCTURE
THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY
JIM ROssi*

Recent "policy-effect" studies denouncejudicial review for its adverse effects on
agency decisionmaking. In its strong version, the policy-effect thesis suggests that
judicial review has paralyzed innovative agency decisionmaking. In this Article,
Professor Rossi reacts to policy-effect studies, particularly as they have been used to
attack the "hard look" doctrine in administrative law. He revisits Professor Richard J.
Pierce's policy-effect description of the effects of judicial review on the.Federal Energy
Professor Rossi's survey of recent FERC
Regulatory Commission (FERC).
decisionmaking provides some support for an attenuated version of the policy-effect
thesis, but leads him to reject the strong version of the thesis.
Much of the policy-effect literature hastily condemns judicial review because it
is costly, unpredictable, and counter-majoritarian. However, Professor Rossi defends
judicial review against the policy-effect attack as a protector of deliberative democratic
values. He suggests that reforms to agency adjudicative mechanisms could alleviate the
problems identified by policy-effect critics, while also allowing judicial review an
opportunity to achieve its benefits.
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INTRODUCTION

Judicial review of agency decisionmaking is under attack. "Policyeffect" studies from the past decade suggest that judicial review of
discretionary decisionmaking has deterred systematic policymaking at
agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),' the
1.
R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN
AIR ACT 344 (1983) ("Court action has encouraged legislators 'and [EPA] administrators
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Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 2 the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 3 and the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC).4

By heaping formidable new tasks on

regulators, judicial review has, 'inthe words of one commentator,
subjected agencies to "debilitating delay and uncertainty," forced them to
"substitute trivial pursuits for important ones," and "discouraged
administrators from taking responsibility for their actions and for
educating the public." 5

In a recent article, Professor Richard Pierce urges us to supplement
the list of agencies paralyzed by judicial review with the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC),6 the independent agency that oversees
federal regulation of the nation's natural gas and electricity industries.

Pierce is especially critical of,the "adequate consideration" doctrine, one
inefficiency and inequities, has made rational debate and conscious political choice
difficult, and has added to frustration and cynicism among participants of all stripes.").
2.
JOHN MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF Toxic SUBSTANCE REGULATION 121
(1955) (contending that strict judicial review causes "OSHA leaders [to] hesitate about
issuing standards for the same reason that graduate students postpone taking their
comprehensive exams: They aren't sure they will pass."); see also Sidney A. Shapiro &
Thomas 0. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives andLegislative Reform,
6 YALE J. ON REo. 1 (1989); Elinor P. Schroeder & Sidney A. Shapiro, Responses to
OccupationalDisease: The Role of Markets, Regulation, and Information, 72 GEo. L.J.
1231 (1984).
3.
Losses in court because of uncertainties concerning the "practicability" of
NHTSA's rules have, according to Mashaw and Harfst, made the agency cautious about
using any safety devices which have not been "road-tested." This has thwarted NHTSA's
statutory mission-to "force the technology" of automobile safety. JERRY L. MASHAW
& DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 69-105, 121-23 (1990)
[hereinafter MASHAW & HARFST, STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY]; see also Jerry L.

Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle
Safety, 4 YALE J.ON REO. 257 (1987).
4.
Barry Boyer, The FederalTrade Commission and ConsumerProtectionPolicy:
A Postmortem Examination, in MAKINO REGULATORY POLICY 93, 102 (Keith Hawkins
& John Thomas eds., 1989) ("Mhe courts reviewing trade regulation rules not only failed
to create a strong incentive for high-quality data and analysis; in some respects, they
seemed to reward poor empirical analysis.").
5.
R. Shep Melnick, Administrative Law and BureaucraticReality, 44 ADMIN.
L. REV. 245, 246 (1992). For further criticism of the role of courts in reviewing
administrative decisionmaking, see ROBERT A. KATZMANN, INSTITUTIONAL DISABILITY:
THE SAGA OF TRANSPORTATION POLICY FOR THE DISABLED (1986); JEREMY RABKIN,
JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS, How PUBLIC LAW DISTORTS PUBLIC POLICY (1989); MARTIN
M. SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION

(1988); Robert A. Kagan, AdversarialLegalism and American Government, 10 J.POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MomT.369 (1991).
6.
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of Judicial Review of Agency
Rules: How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of the 1990s, 43
ADMIN. L. REV. 7 (1991) [hereinafter Pierce, Electricity Crisis].
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example of the hard look doctrine which the D.C. Circuit and other lower
federal courts 7 have applied to FERC's rulemaking efforts.' According
to Pierce, the manner in which courts have applied the adequate
consideration doctrine to FERC's law and policy choices has left the
agency's staff awash in uncertainty, demoralized, and unable to make new
choices. As a result, Pierce predicts that federal efforts to continue
reform of the natural gas industry and to commence competitive reform
of the electric utility industry will be thwarted. The consequences which
Pierce predicts are harsh: he considers it likely that we will face a series
of serious electricity shortages in the near future if courts do not get out
of the way." Pierce's article is significant because it is the first scholarly
examination of the effects of judicial review on FERC's policymaking.
If supported by the evidence, his account would support broad judicial
deference to FERC's legal and policy decisions and provide additional
empirical grounding for those who have argued that judicial review of
agency rulemaking leads to policy paralysis.
In this Article, I revisit some of Pierce's predictions and examine
critically Pierce's observations of the effects of appellate court
applications of the adequate consideration doctrine to agency
policymaking in the energy context, particularly federal efforts to
restructure competitively the economic norms and institutions of the
7.
Over 70% of appeals of FERC orders from the past seven years were filed
with the D.C. Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, according to a review of data from the
Administrative Conference of the United States. The overwhelming majority of these
appeals were filed with the D.C. Circuit; in 1992, over 80% of all appeals were filed with
the D.C. Circuit alone. This percentage has continued to increase each year recorded.
See 5 DAVID J. MUCHOW & WILLIAM A. MOoEL, ENERGY LAW & TRANSACTIONS §
143.03[21 (1993).

8.
To date, the doctrine has been invoked against FERC primarily in the natural
gas context. See, e.g., American Gas Ass'n v. FERC, 888 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(reversing Order No. 500 on the basis that FERC did not engage in "reasoned
decisionmaking" when it chose to rely on cross-contract crediting, rather than an
alternative regulatory measure, in its attempt to allocate a higher proportion of transition
costs to gas producers), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 952 (1990); Public Util. Comm'n v.
FERC, 817 F.2d 858, 862-63 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (reversing FERC's authorization for
pipelines to retain accumulated tax reserves because FERC had not 'adequately
considered" the alternative of effecting an "equitable" allocation of accumulated tax
reserves between pipelines and their customers); see also infra note 50 and cases cited
therein.
9.
The social implications of a serious electricity shortage are dire. Historically,
electricity has comprised a crucial sector of the American economy, not only as a means
of sustaining current industrial operations, but also as an integral agent for technological
progress and improvements in standards of living. See SAM H. SCHURR ET AL.,
ELECTRICITY IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: AGENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS
(1990).
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electric utility industry. 0 I use Pierce's account as a springboard for
discussing judicial review and the hard look doctrine in the electric utility
industry restructuring context. However, my discussion also responds in
general to others who have denounced judicial review on the basis of its
policy effects on the reviewed agency.
Following a brief description of Pierce's article in Part I, Part II
suggests that his account fails to control for non-judicial factors which
may affect FERC's policy decisions, such as statutory constraints on
FERC's discretion under the Federal Power Act (FPA)."1 Considering
statutory constraints on an agency's discretion, I argue, is an issue
logically prior to and doctrinally distinct from reviewing the agency's
exercise of discretion. Because statutory constraints have significantly
curtailed FERC's ability to make certain reforms in ihe electricity context,
it is difficult to attribute regulatory inaction to judicial review absent a
comprehensive study which takes into account their role. This descriptive
problem with Pierce's account, I suggest, foreshadows a more systemic
problem with policy-effect critiques generally. Thus, it is prudent to
approach these critiques with an informed skepticism and to hesitate to
generalize from them prior to a comprehensive study of the specific
regulatory context at hand.
Part III surveys some regulatory developments at FERC in the
electric utility context over the last several years. Pierce makes sweeping
predictions about the impact of judicial review on FERC's decisionmaking
processes; however, he does not present any evidence of judicial review's
actual effect on FERC's restructuring of the electric utility industry.
While this Article does not purport to provide a comprehensive and
conclusory empirical examination, it does draw on the vantage point of
hindsight to revisit some of Pierce's predictions. In the few short years
since Pierce penned his critique, the electric utility industry has
10.
The scope of my analysis is limited to federal regulatory efforts to restructure
the background economic institutions and norms within which electricity industry players
(utilities, consumers, etc.) conduct their long-term supply and demand planning and dayto-day transactions, specifically at the wholesale level. I do not address regulatory
activities directed towards retail transactions or conservation measures, such as demandside management and integrated resource planning. Although these regulatory activities
are clearly related to the economic structure activities at wholesale which are the primary
subject of my analysis, I exclude them from consideration here because, as a general
matter, they fall outside of FERC's jurisdiction. For a general discussion of some of the
state regulatory efforts directed towards conservation, see Daniel Yergin et al., Caught
in the Muddle: The Dilemma of Today's Electric Power Industry, NAT. RESOURcES &
ENV'T, Winter 1994, at 3 (noting conflicts between state regulation of conservation efforts
and federal efficiency-driven restructuring efforts).
11.
The FPA, the primary statute governing regulation of the electricity industry
at the federal level, appears at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-825r (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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experienced a very dynamic transformation, in part due to regulatory
In addition,
innovations developed in proceedings before FERC.
Congress passed the Comprehensive National Energy Policy Act of 1992
broadening significantly FERC's statutory
(Energy Policy Act),
authority to restructure the industry. Transformation of the electric utility
industry, while still fledgling, is irreversible. These developments
counter Pierce's apocalyptic prediction that courts' applications of the
hard look doctrine will portend regulatory stalemate, but do lend some
support to an attenuated version of the policy-effect thesis.
However, Part IV argues that even if a weak interpretation of the
policy-effect thesis is empirically supportable, this alone should not lead
us to constrict application of the hard look doctrine in the energy context.
Pierce's account, like other policy-effect critiques, focuses on the narrow,
intra-agency effects of judicial review, but ignores inter-institutional
incentive effects, particularly impacts on legislative choice. Especially
where an agency's decisionmaking authority is constrained by statute, it
is appropriate for Congress to make policy choices extending jurisdiction,
rather than allow the agency unfettered discretion to reformulate its
direction as it sees fit. Judicial review, I argue, may have prompted
congressional action on issues such as transmission access in the Energy
Policy Act, and may similarly lead Congress to broaden FERC's
jurisdiction in the future on issues such as retail transactions.
Perhaps more importantly though, many policy-effect critics,
including Pierce, fail to adequately address normative arguments in favor
of the hard look doctrine. While Pierce has presented a theory
minimizing the judiciary's role in reviewing agency discretion, 3
deliberative democratic theory provides a compelling normative argument
in favor of judicial review as a protector of increased citizen participation
and deliberative government. The affirmation of these normative values,
I argue, comprises the core of the hard look doctrine. In many instances,
including the context of electric utility industry restructuring, the hard
look doctrine, properly applied, is a legitimate and fully warranted
exercise of judicial authority.
Part V makes some recommendations for reform. The primary
concern voiced by policy-effect critics of judicial review, such as Pierce,
is agency failure to make law and policy by means of systematic
12.
Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992).
13.
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in
Administrative Law, 64 TEx. L. REv. 469, 520 (1985) [hereinafter Pierce, Political
Theory] (arguing that agencies should only be delegated discretion under heavy oversight
from the President, and arguing that such oversight is the only solution to the problem of
broad congressional delegation compatible with constitutional and political theory).
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rulemaking, as opposed to ad hoc adjudication.14 Even if we can
pinpoint judicial review as a significant cause of this regulatory problem,
however, there is a way to solve it without curtailing the judiciary's role.
One option is a default mechanism favoring rulemaking as a methodology
for formulating law and policy. After rejecting this option, I explore
reforms to adjudicative mechanisms. FERC's ability to make prospective
policy choices of precedential effect in adjudicative proceedings may belie
the rulemaking/adjudication distinction, canonical to administrative law.
If this is so, I argue, conceptual and institutional reforms to adjudication,
designed to increase agency accountability and deliberation, are the
Statutory reforms or court-driven
soundest route for reform.
modifications to FERC's adjudicative mechanisms may enhance
systematic policymaking, legitimacy, and accountability in a manner fully
compatible with judicial review.

I.

PIERCE'S

ACCOUNT OF THE EFFECTS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

After introducing the rulemaking/adjudication option available to
most agencies making law and policy, this Part describes Pierce's account
of the adverse effects of judicial review on FERC's policy choices. At
his most general level, Pierce argues that the current attitude of federal
courts toward reviewing FERC rules is bad for public policy. Drawing
on the analysis in Pierce's article, I present two versions of the policyeffect thesis: one strong, the other weak. In its strongest form, the
policy-effect thesis predicts that applying the hard look doctrine will
paralyze FERC's efforts to restructure systematically the natural gas and
electric utility industries. An attenuated version of the policy-effect thesis
predicts that application of the hard look doctrine increases the costs to
FERC of engaging in rulemaking and thus encourages the agency to shift
its policymaking resources to adjudicative proceedings.
A. The Rulemaking/AdjudicationDistinction
Before presenting in full Pierce's account and its implications, it is
useful to lay out two distinctive methodologies available to agencies in
formulating law and policy: rulemaking and adjudication. As defined in
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), a rule is a statement of general
applicability and future effect that implements, interprets, or prescribes
law or policy, or the organization, procedures, and standards for practice
before an agency. 5 Rules arise from formal or informal rulemaking
14.
15.

See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1988).

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
proceedings before the issuing administrative agency. Rules create law
in the form of statements which are binding on those persons or entities
to whom they are addressed, regardless of whether those persons or
entities participated in the rulemaking proceeding which generated the
rule. Rules bind the agency in future cases; however, in certain
instances, and within limitation, they may be waived.16
An adjudicative order, on the other hand, is an agency statement of
particular applicability determining the rights of, or applying law or
policy to, specific individuals or entities on the basis of their special
circumstances.17 Such orders generally arise as the result of an
adjudicative proceeding involving persons who have asserted an interest
sufficient to meet the agency's intervention standards."5
An
individualized adjudicative proceeding, which often, but not always,
involves a hearing, allows the agency to tailor application of its law or
policy to the specific time, place, and context of persons affected. Such
an order generally adopts principles or rules of law as necessary to solve
the specific case before the agency. The impact of adjudicative orders,
however, is often broader than the specific case at hand, as an order may
serve as precedent in similar future cases.
As a general matter, agencies should adopt and elaborate principles
of law and policy by rulemaking rather than by ad hoc adjudication. 9
Because rules overlook the particularities of time, place, and context, they
16.
See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Making Policy Through the Waiver of Regulations at
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. (forthcoming Winter
1995).
17.
It is a recurring theme in jurisprudence that rules cannot fully achieve justice.
For example, Aristotle distinguished between "legal" justice, which is based on general
rules, and "equity," which corrects the imperfections and injustices in legal rules.
ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 166-68 (J.A.K. Thompson trans., 1953). Acts IV
and V of Shakespeare's play The Merchant of Venice raise the theme of whether mercy
should season justice, as equity would season legal rules. The character Portia (disguised
as a male jurist) symbolizes mercy; her character is juxtaposed against Shylock, who
stands for legal justice-the Rule of Law. This play and the tension between Portia and
Shylock have generated much discussion among law and literature and feminist scholars.
See, e.g., Symposium, Merchant of Venice, 5 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 1
(1993); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, PortiaRedux: Another Look at Gender Feminism and
Legal Ethics, in LEGAL ETHICS (Stephen Parker ed., forthcoming 1994); Carrie MenkelMeadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Woman's Lawyering Process, 1

BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985).
18.
5 U.S.C. § 551(6), (7) (1988).
19.
See, e.g., Pierce, Electricity Crisis, supra note 6, at 11-13; Merton C.
Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rulemaking Dilemma Under the Administrative
ProcedureAct, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970); David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking
or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921
(1965).
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have the inherent values of predictability, stability, uniformity, and
control. Yet, adjudication is skeptical about these very values. In
addition to the inherent values of final rules, there are several reasons

why rulemaking is preferable as a decisionmaking methodology.'
First, as a matter of procedural fairness, a rulemaking proceeding
allows all persons who might be affected by agency lawmaking the
opportunity to participate.21 Adjudication, on the other hand, generally
affords a right of participation only to those persons who meet the
agency's intervention rules and are parties to an actual dispute.'
However, adjudicative orders can have the same precedential effect as

rules.'

Thus, persons ultimately affected by a particular adjudicative

decision will often not have had the effective opportunity to participate in
its formulation.

Second, rulemaking is a more democratic, and hence more
legitimate, mechanism for making law and policy. The general public
does not have a meaningful opportunity to evaluate and influence law or

policy made on a case-by-case, precedential basis. Rulemaking is more
quasi-legislative in nature than is an adjudicative proceeding; it is likely
to be simpler for members of the general public to discern current agency
law from rules than from case-by-case adjudication because decisional law
is generally more voluminous, technical, and difficult to understand. In
addition, case-by-case proceedings allow agencies to bypass formidable
legislative and executive oversight mechanisms designed to ensure that
20.
Of course, I am not suggesting that rulemaking should be favored in all
instances. Adjudication has an inherent value in its particularism, which is antithetical to
rulemaking. In many instances, particularism may be preferable to generic rules. For
example, where due process considerations demand individualized determinations,
agencies should be required to proceed by adjudication rather than rulemaking. See, e.g.,
Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1908) (requiring
adjudication because a small number of persons were exceptionally affected, in each case
upon individualized grounds); see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), in which the D.C. Circuit required the Federal Power Commission, FERC's
predecessor, to render decisions through adjudicative procedures in order to "realistically
tailor the proceedings to fit the issues before it, the formation it needs to illuminate those
issues and the manner of presentation." Id. at 1252 (quoting City of Chicago v. FPC, 458
F.2d 731, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972)).
21.
See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988) (formal rulemaking); 5 U.S.C. §§ 556,557 (1988)
(formal adjudication).
22.
5 U.S.C. § 554(c) (1988) (limiting participation to "interested parties").
FERC's application of a strict intervention standard in precedent-setting adjudicative
proceedings is discussed infra note 300.
23.
The precedential effect of case-by-case decisionmaking at FERC is discussed
further infra part III.

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

agency lawmaking is not inconsistent with the will of the community at
large? 4
Third, rulemaking is generally a more efficient mechanism for
making law and policy than adjudication. Lawmaking by adjudication
requires litigation before the agency in a series of highly fact-specific
cases, whereas a single rule may settle policy questions across multiple
case-specific scenarios. Fact-specific litigation as a decisionmaking
mechanism places a serious burden on an agency's scarce resources. For
example, adjudicative proceedings before FERC sometimes have required
a decade or more to complete, after which time the record is often "stale"
or the important policy issues are moot. 25 Lawmaking by rule is also
more efficient than lawmaking by adjudication because it allows agencies
to focus on a few proceedings raising major policy issues, rather than
spread their resources and attention thinly over large numbers of cases
which raise a combination of major and minor policy issues.'
Thus, rulemaking is generally preferable to ad hoc adjudication
because it contributes to procedural fairness, democratic legitimacy, and
efficiency. However, despite the strong preference of most administrative
law commentators for rulemaking over adjudication, under existing law
there is no judicial mechanism for requiring federal agencies to make law
by rule rather than by ad hoc adjudication. In SEC v. Chenery Corp.,'
the United States Supreme Court refused to require the Securities and
Exchange Commission to issue a prospective rule prior to determining
that certain corporate insiders could not profit from trading in the stock
of their corporation while it was being reorganized. The Court stressed
that there was a clear place for lawmaking on a case-by-case basis: "[Tihe
choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc
litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the
24.
Pierce, Electricity Crisis, supra note 6, at 12 (noting that ad hoc adjudication
permits agencies to avoid the high costs of publicly visible policy-making).
25.
id. at 12-13.
26.
Bernstein, supra note 19, at 590-92 ("The principal advantage of rule making
is that it provides a clear articulation of broad agency policy. By contrast, the entire array
of [an agency's) adjudicative decisions on a subject often gives a diffuse, overly subtle
mosaic of current [agency] doctrine."). For similar reasons, rulemaking has a general
advantage over adjudication for regulatory counsel representing small clients. Smaller
clients are unwilling to invest their scarce resources on interventions in scattered
adjudicative proceedings because it is extremely expensive to have an impact on such
proceedings, assuming the agency is willing to entertain interventions in the first place.
Rulemaking proceedings, on the other hand, provide counsel with broader, more
compelling policy reasons to formulate client groups. As they are more highly publicized
and visible, it is simpler for counsel to inspire client interest.
27.
332 U.S. 194 (1947).
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administrative agency."'

To require rulemaking, the Court reasoned,

would "stultify" the administrative process and would "exalt form over
necessity."" A majority of the Court has since insisted that if agencies

desire to issue rules of future effect and general applicability they must
use rulemaking proceedings;' ° however, as a principle of positive law,
Chenery's basic principle remains unmodified-the choice of a
methodology for making and elaborating law or policy will not be

imposed by the federal courts.
B. JudicialReview of FERC's Natural Gas RestructuringRulemakings

In the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA), 31 enacted in 1978, Congress
established a complicated framework for the partial decontrol of natural
gas at the wellhead, giving FERC a clear directive to implement a
competitive market structure in the natural gas industry. 2 Following
this unambiguous directive, FERC promulgated a series of rules to clarify
and implement the NGPA. Within two years of the NGPA's passage, the

industry faced a relatively clear and comprehensive set of rules.
Reviewing courts affirmed most of these rules, 3 Pierce observes,
because of "the high degree of deference courts accord an agency's initial
.28.
Id. at 203.
29.
Id. at 202.
30.
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 765-66 (1969) (plurality
opinion); id. at 775 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 780 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
31.
15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
32.
The framework was implemented by a series of regulatory changes. First,
federal wellhead price controls were to be extended to all gas production, and natural gas
transportation between interstate and intrastate markets was authorized. This eliminated
the dual markets for interstate and intrastate natural gas, originally established in the
Natural Gas Act. Second, statutory ceiling prices for all categories of gas production
were established in lieu of rates determined just and reasonable by the Federal Power
Commission. The ceiling prices for certain categories of gas production were set at levels
intended to provide an incentive for developing new sources of supply. Third,
approximately one-half of the nation's natural gas supply was scheduled to be deregulated
in a series of steps between 1979 and 1987. The elimination of the dual market, the
establishment of incentive ceiling prices for certain categories of gas production, and the
expectations which accompanied the plan for phased wellhead decontrol created strong
incentives for increased natural gas production. These incentives, coupled with the
NGPA's demand-saving regulations and decreases in consumption brought about by the
recession of the early 1980s, transformed the natural gas market from a condition of
shortage to excess supply. For a discussion of these statutory-driven changes, see
generally Charles G. Stalon & Reinier H.J.H. Lock, State-Federal Relations in the
Economic Regulation of Energy, 7 YALE J. ON REo. 427, 477-78 (1990); Donald F.
Santa, Jr. & Patricia J. Beneke, Federal Natural Gas Policy and the Energy Policy Act
of 1992, 14 ENEROY L.J. 1, 5-6 (1993).
33. , See, e.g., ECEE, Inc. v. FERC, 645 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981).
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interpretations of a recently enacted statute. "34 Following this initial
rulemaking activity, and blessed with an unprecedented surplus of
deliverable gas in the industry, 35 FERC issued several rules intended to
restructure the natural gas industry so as to make it competitive, including
s
3
FERC Order Nos. 380,1 436, 1 and 500.3
In reviewing FERC's restructuring rules, appellate courts have
applied the hard look doctrine, first endorsed by the Supreme Court in
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass' v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. 39 Courts applying the hard look doctrine examine the
basis for an agency's decision in order to determine whether the agency
engaged in reasoned decisionmaking by taking a "hard look" at the salient
problems. The State Farm Court said a rule
would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered
an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.10
When courts apply this doctrine, they generally examine an agency's
decision to determine whether the agency has explained the basis for its
rule, whether the agency's decision is consistent with substantive law. If,
in adopting a final policy choice, the agency failed to consider relevant
alternatives or based its decision on factors Congress did not intend it to
have considered, the court will reverse the agency's decision and remand
to the agency for further explanation.
34.
Pierce, Electricity Crisis, supra note 6, at 14.
35.
Robert J. Michaels, The New Age of Natural Gas: How the Regulators
Brought Competition, R.GULATION, Winter 1993, at 68, 69.
36.
Elimination of Variable Costs from Certain Natural Gas Pipeline Minimum
Commodity Bill Provisions, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,778 (1984) (codified at 18 C.F.R. § 154).
37.
Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 50
Fed. Reg. 42,408 (1985) (codified as amended at 18 C.F.R. §§ 2, 157, 250, 284, 375,
381).
38.
Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 52
Fed. Reg. 30,334 (1987) (codified as amended at 18 C.F.R. §§ 2, 284).
39.
463 U.S. 29 (1983). The doctrine was originally enunciated by the D.C.
Circuit in Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cit. 1970)
(taking a "searching and careful" review of the basis for the agency's decision in order
to ensure that the agency has engaged in reasoned decisionmaking), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
23 (1971).
40.
463 U.S. at 43.
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FERC's restructuring rulemakings in the natural gas context initially
fared well under appellate court applications of the hard look doctrine.
The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed FERC Order No. 380 in
Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC.4 In a pair of 1985 opinions, the District
of Columbia Circuit urged FERC to adopt a previously proposed agency
policy-the provision of consumer access to pipeline transportation of gas
available from alternative suppliers. 2
FERC responded to these
decisions by issuing Order No. 436, which contained a de facto
requirement that pipelines provide equal access to their facilities, thus
exposing them to competition in the wholesale natural gas market. In
Associated Gas Distributorsv. FERC (AGD), 43 the District of Columbia
Circuit held that FERC had the power to coerce pipelines into accepting
equal access to create a competitive market designed to yield "just and
reasonable" wholesale gas prices. However, the AGD court remanded
Order No. 436 to FERC on the basis that FERC had not adequately
considered the potential transition effects of its new policy."
FERC responded with Order No. 500, an elaborate new plan to
allocate the costs of the transition to its new market-based policy. Order
No. 500 conditioned producer access to a pipeline system on the
producer's willingness to allow the pipeline to credit one unit of
contractual purchase obligation for each unit of gas the pipeline
transported on behalf of that producer, one of the reallocation methods
mentioned by the AGD court. However, in American Gas Ass 'n v. FERC
(AGA),' the District of Columbia Circuit reversed Order No. 500 on
two grounds, one substantive and the other procedural. First, the court
held that FERC did not, as required by AGD, "reassess its refusal to act
[against uneconomic contracts] under § 5 [of the Natural Gas Act]" or
explain "its reasons for inaction ... clearly enough for us to determine
the legality of its analysis."' Secondly, the court noted, FERC had
failed to adequately consider the alternatives when it chose to rely on
cross-contract crediting, rather than on an alternative regulatory measure,
in its attempt to allocate a higher proportion of transition costs to gas
producers. 7

41.
770 F.2d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1114 (1986).
42.
Maryland People's Counsel v. FERC, 761 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Maryland People's Counsel v. FERC, 761 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
43.
824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter AGD].
44.
Id. at 1028-30.
45.
888 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 952 (1990)
[hereinafter AGA].
46.
Id. at 147 (citing AGD, 824 F.2d at 1028).
47.
Id. at 142-48.
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AGA is a misapplication of the hard look doctrine, Pierce argues,
because FERC had considered an alternative to its final policy
choice-modifying the terms of price or quantity in jurisdictional

contracts."
The District of Columbia Circuit found FERC's
consideration of this alternative, without an explanation that contained a
reasoned discussion of other alternatives, insufficient. In a later case, the
District of Columbia Circuit ultimately affirmed Order No. 500. 49
Because of appellate court application of the hard look doctrine in
AGA and other cases reversing FERC restructuring rules,' Pierce's
article predicts that "FERC will not complete the process of transition to
a market-based regulatory regime in the gas industry. " 5 But events
following publication of Pierce's article render this prediction incorrect:
in 1992, FERC issued Order No. 636, which was the final step necessary
to create a truly competitive natural gas market.52 Thus, FERC's actual
policy choices in the natural gas context seem to contradict Pierce's
thesis, in both its strong and its weaker forms. To the extent, however,
that Pierce is critical of judicial review for delaying final judgment as to
the legality of FERC's regulations, his prediction may prove correct. If

past cases are any indication, the industry and FERC are unlikely to have
a non-appealable court decision on Order No. 636 for several years.

48.
Pierce, Electricity Crisis, supra note 6, at 20.
49.
American Gas Ass'n v. FERC, 912 F.2d 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1094 (1991).
50.
See, e.g., Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 893 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(reversing FERC's method of allocating transition costs from pipelines to distributors),
cert. denied sub nom. Berkshire Gas Co. v. Associated Gas Distribs., 498 U.S. 907
(1990); Mobil Oil Exploration and Producing Southeast, Inc. v. FERC, 885 F.2d 209 (5th
Cir. 1989) (reversing Order No. 451 on the basis that FERC did not adequately consider
transition costs), rev'd, 498 U.S. 211 (1991); Consolidated Edison Co. v. FERC, 823
F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (reversing relaxation of barriers to market exit on the basis
that FERC did not adequately consider the potential reallocation of transition costs).
51.
Pierce, Electricity Crisis, supra note 6, at 19.
52.
On April 8, 1992, FERC issued Order No. 636, which, according to FERC,
.complete[d] the evolution to competition to the natural gas industry." 57 Fed. Reg.
13,268 (1992). Order No. 636 unbundled pipeline sales from transportation, required
pipelines to provide no-notice transportation service to replace (and replicate) the
traditional pipeline sale, mandated capacity brokering programs on all interstate pipelines,
and allowed parties to make sales at negotiated rates. Pipeline Service Obligations and
Revisions to Regulations Governing Self-Implementing Transportation and Regulation of
Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,267 (1992),
order on reh'g, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,128 (1992), order on reh'g, 57 Fed. Reg. 57,911 (1992),
appealsfiled, Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. FERC, No. 92-1342 (D.C. Cir. 1992),
Atlanta Gas Light Co. & Chattanooga Gas Co. v. FERC, No. 92-8782 (D.C. Cir. 1992);
see also Michaels, supra note 35.

1994:763

Redeeming JudicialReview

C. Pierce'sPredictionof the Effects of JudicialReview on Electric
Utility Industry Restructuring
Pierce does not limit his critique of the hard look doctrine to FERC's
restructuring rulemakings in the natural gas context. He also extends his
critique to FERC's regulatory efforts to reform the competitive structure
of the electric utility industry. The adequate consideration doctrine has
been applied in cases like AGA, Pierce suggests, as "a pretext for
rejecting any policy decision that displeases the reviewing judges." 53
Due to agency uncertainty of reviewing court expectations and higher
anticipated probabilities of reversal, Pierce predicts that the adequate
consideration doctrine, as applied in cases like AGA, will hamper
competitive restructuring of the electric utility industry at FERC.
Although reviewing court actions have not directly stopped FERC
initiatives, according to Pierce their lack of hospitality to FERC's
rulemaking efforts has demoralized and delegitimated the agency's
policymaking process.' Judicial review has resulted in nothing more
than a "battle among lawyers," casting FERC "awash in a sea of
uncertainties. "
Two versions of the policy-effect thesis emerge from Pierce's article.
According to the stronger version of this thesis, the hard look doctrine as
applied by lower courts destroys any incentives for FERC to develop a
systematic regulatory structure which encourages investment in generating
capacity sufficient to avoid an electricity shortage in the 1990s.' The
strong version of the policy-effect thesis views judicial review as
paralyzing. Pierce also at times invokes a weaker version of the policyeffect thesis-that reviewing courts' applications of the hard look doctrine
may decrease FERC's tendency to resolve difficult policy issues through
rulemaking and encourage FERC instead to engage in "unprincipled, ad
hoc" adjudicative decisionmaking.57 This weaker thesis views judicial
53.
Pierce, Electricity Crisis, supra note 6, at 28.
54.
According to Pierce:
Even when a major change in regulatory policy is desperately needed, urged
on an agency by the courts, welcomed by Congress, and implemented in a
manner that yields enormous improvements in the performance of a regulated
market, FERC's experience has shown that an agency and its staff can be
publicly labeled lawless and incompetent for making such a change.
Id. at 18.
55.
Id. at 26 (citing Thomas 0. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory
Reform, 65 TEX. L. REv. 1243, 1290 (1987)).
56.
Id. at 19; see also id. at 9 (stating that rulemaking is necessary to address the
problem).
57.
Id. at 27. Pierce notes that, even before the rise of the hard look doctrine in
the 1970s, FERC opted to make its choices in adjudicative rather than rulemaking
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review as delaying, hindering somewhat, and limiting-but not
paralyzing-FERC-driven competitive reforms.
Pierce does not proffer any data in support of these theses; his
evidence is, at best, anecdotal. Nevertheless, he warns us that if either
thesis is correct, unencumbered judicial review will have apocalyptic
consequences for consumers, utilities, and others in the electric utility
industry: blackouts and brownouts will likely ensue."'
In light-or, perhaps, in the potential darkness-of these
"unintended" adverse effects, Pierce makes two suggestions for regulatory
reform. First, he suggests that the Supreme Court set out doctrinal
changes reducing the discretion of lower court judges to apply the
adequate consideration doctrine. Second, he recommends that the federal
courts of appeals change their internal procedures for reviewing agency
policy decisions in ways that reduce the discretion of individual judges
and three judge panels to send inconsistent messages to agencies.59
Pierce's second recommendation echoes suggestions similar to those
made elsewhere in the literature.' It is not the primary topic of this
Article. This Article focuses on Pierce's first recommendation-that the
Supreme Court pull in the reins on the discretion of lower courts to apply
the hard look doctrine. As I will argue, we should be skeptical about this
recommendation due to both descriptive and normative faults with the
account of judicial review's effects presented in Pierce's article. His
account is descriptively inaccurate because, as argued in Part II, it fails
to take into account statutory constraints on FERC's discretion and, at
least with respect to his stronger thesis, his account does not "fit"
FERC's recent policy choices as described in Part III. Part IV presents
a normative theory that, I argue, can redeem judicial review from some
of Pierce's criticisms. In Part V, I present some reforms designed to
enhance the compatibility of judicial review with this normative theory.

proceedings: "By pretending to be a specialized court, 'storing' policy issues by referring
them to 'nigh-interminable' adjudicatory hearings, and hiding policy issues under a
mountain of idiosyncratic facts, FERC minimized its political risks." Id. at 18.
58.
Id.at 7.
59.
Id. at 28-29.
60.
Pierce suggests modeling such reforms on the Tax Court's system of internal
checks and balances. For an alternative, but similarly motivated, reform suggestion, see
Harold H. Bruff, CoordinatingJudicialReview in AdministrativeLaw, 39 UCLA L. REV.
1193, 1247 (1992) (advocating a national panel which allocates en banc review to
particular regional circuits, but noting whatever reforms are adopted "there is [a] special
need for a coordinating institution in administrative law").
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II. THE CONSTRAINTS OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW

Pierce claims that the hard look doctrine, as applied by reviewing
courts, is one cause of FERC's failure to restructure the electric utility
industry towards competition. The hard look doctrine is a judiciallyenunciated twist61 on two standards in the APA: (1) the requirement that
an agency "incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement
of their basis and purpose";62 and (2) the "arbitrary and capricious"
review standard.' The purpose of the doctrine is to facilitate review of
the reasonableness of an agency's exercise of discretion, not to ascertain
whether agency action is consistent with the court's reading of governing
substantive law. However, determining statutory constraints on an
agency's discretion is an issue prior to, and doctrinally distinct from,
reviewing the appropriateness of an agency's exercise of its discretion.'
Thus, Pierce's general thesis regarding the effects of judicial review
presupposes that FERC had the discretion, under governing substantive
law within its jurisdiction, to comprehensively restructure the industry in
competitive ways. However, as this Part shows, statutes constrained
FERC's discretion to achieve substantial pro-competitive reforms for the
electric utility industry at the time Pierce wrote his article.'
A. The Changing Structure of the Electric Utility Industry
As an initial matter, some industry background is in order.
Traditionally, most regulators considered the electric utility industry a
61.

The doctrine was first endorsed by the Supreme Court in State Farm,

discussed supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.

62.
5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1988). The legislative history of § 553 suggests that
Congress intended to require more than a purely formal and routine explanatory burden
on agencies. See S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 201 (1946) ("The agency must
analyze and consider all relevant matter presented. The required statement of the basis
and purpose of rules issued should not only relate to the data so presented but with
reasonable fullness explain the actual basis and objectives of the rule."); id. at 20 ("The
statement of the 'basis and purpose' of rules issued will vary with the rule, but in any case
should be fully explanatory of the complete factual and legal basis as well as the real
object or objects sought.").
63.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988).
64.
See infra notes 102-22 and accompanying text.
65.
Pierce is not the only commentator who has ignored statutory constraints in
examining agency decisionmaking. For a similar critique of studies of the International
Trade Commission informed by public choice theory, see Keith B. Anderson, Agency
Discretion or Statutory Direction: Decision Making at the U.S. International Trade
Commission, 36 J. L. & ECON. 915, 915 (1993) (noting others' "failure to consider the

extent to which agency decisions are based on the statutory requirements under which the
agency operates").
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paradigmatic natural monopoly. The electricity rate for customers within
a utility's government-defined franchise area was regulated on a cost-ofservice basis. States implemented such regulation at the retail level. At
the wholesale level, FERC exercised its jurisdiction over sales of power
for resale under the FPA.' Traditional utilities, most of which are
investor-owned and operate pursuant to local monopoly franchises,
occupied the dominant market position under this regulatory paradigm.67
Recent technological innovations and realized economic efficiencies,
coupled with the deregulatory climate of the 1980s," have led many to
rethink this regulatory paradigm. Although there is disagreement over the
details of restructuring the industry, today there is a strong consensus that
the industry can be separated into (at least) two types of markets: a
market for bulk power (or wholesale electric generation) and a market for
transmission services. Most commentators, including Pierce, believe that
while bulk power markets are characterized by competitive conditions and
should be "deregulated" to allow market forces and competition to work,
transmission services remain a natural monopoly, and should be regulated
to provide "open access" to the power grid on competitive terms and
conditions.' Thus, to be effective, regulatory reform must focus on two
66.
FERC's jurisdiction under Part II of the FPA, which regulates the activities
of electric utilities engaged in interstate commerce, is limited to sales "at wholesale in
interstate commerce." 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (1988). Regulation of retail transactions is
generally reserved to the states, unless otherwise noted by Congress.
67.
Approximately 75% of U.S. electric consumers are served by private, profitmaking electric companies. Public power systems-utilities owned by the taxpayers of
a city, county, or other public area-serve approximately 15% of all consumers. The
remaining 10% of consumers are served by about 1,000 rural electric cooperatives, nonprofit entities owned and managed by their users. See AMERICAN PUBLIC POWER
ASSOCIATION, PUBLIC POWER FACTS (1992).
68.
The deregulation movement has focused primarily on structurally competitive
industries, such as airlines, railroads, buses, cable television, oil, and natural gas. In
most of these cases, unlike the electric utility industry, the original justification for
regulation was not natural monopoly. For general background, see ALFRED E. KAHN,
THE ECONOMICS OF REoULATION, at xv-xvii (1988). On the adverse societal effects of
deregulation, see Theodore P. Harris, The Disaster of Deregulation, 20 TRANSP. L.J. 87
(1991); Paul S. Dempsey, The Dark Side of Deregulation: ItsImpact on Small
Communities, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 445 (1987).
69.
See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., A Proposalto Deregulate the Marketfor
Bulk Power, 72 VA. L. REv. 1183 (1986) [hereinafter Pierce, Deregulate]. The most
comprehensive summary of these issues from an economic perspective is PAUL L. JOSKOW
& RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY
DEREOULATION (1983). Recent changes in transmission service technologies, if made
available at economic costs, could lead to more competitive transmission services as well.
Matthew L. Wald, Smoothing the Flow of Electricity in Bulk, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1992,
at F12. However, because of its network nature, transmission may continue to require
some sort of regulation to ensure access, reliability and efficiency.
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key issues: (1) "deregulation" of bulk power generation' and (2)
modification of transmission regulation to provide "open access" on
competitive terms and conditions.
With respect to both of these issues, however, FERC lacked
discretion to achieve competitive reforms until Congress passed the
Energy Policy Act in late 1992. Prior to this time, FERC did not have
the clear and comprehensive authority to level the competitive playing
field in bulk power markets, or to require "open access" to the power

grid.
B. Statutory Constraintson FERC's Discretionto Increase Competition

in Bulk Power Generation
The first regulatory attempt to interject competition into bulk power
markets was the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
(PURPA),71 passed by Congress in reaction to the energy crisis of the

early 1970s. PURPA's primary purposes were to encourage the
conservation of electric energy, to protect customers, and to increase
efficiency in the use of transmission and generation. Unlike the NGPA,

which gave FERC a clear directive to restructure the natural gas industry
and encourage competition, PURPA did not give FERC carte blanche to
introduce competition to all sectors of the electric utility industry.'
70.
"Deregulation" is probably too strong a word to describe the desirable nature
of regulatory reform in the electric utility industry. There is disagreement concerning the
appropriate level of deregulation and privatization of bulk power generation. In a
thoughtful analysis, the economist Carl Pechman has recently argued that the role of
regulation, not its degree, needs to adapt to facilitate information exchange and eliminate
informational abuse by utilities. CARL PECHMAN, REGULATING POWER: THE ECONOMICS
OF ELECTRICITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1993); see also KENNETH E. TRAIN,
OPTIMAL REGULATION: THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY (1991)

(arguing for a prudential mix between regulation and deference to market forces); Douglas
Gegax & Kenneth Nowotny, Competition and the Electric Utility Industry.-An Evaluation,
10 YALE J. ON REG. 63 (1993) (arguing that, although there are clearly problems with
regulation of the electricity industry, deregulation is not the answer). Similarly, Professor
Susan Rose-Ackerman has noted that deregulation with respect to one issue can lead to
regulation with respect to other issues. SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE
PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 153

(1992). Therefore, with a few exceptions, I generally describe what are commonly
referred to as "deregulatory" efforts in bulk power generation markets-efforts more akin
to incentive regulation to equalize or improve competition than pure deregulation-under
the rubric of "restructuring."
Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§
71.
824a-1 to a-3, 824i-k, 2601-2645, and scattered sections of 16 and 42 U.S.C.).
72.
See 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (1988) (PURPA's preamble, noting purposes of
increased conservation and increased efficiency, but not directing FERC to increase
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Incident to its goals of promoting conservation and increasing
efficiency, PURPA did contain several pro-competitive reforms. Most
notably, PURPA created regulatory benefits for a type of non-utility
generator (NUG) which could compete with traditional utilities-the
qualifying facility (QF) which meets certain size, engineering, fuel use,
and ownership criteria.' Since PURPA's passage, QFs have interjected
an element of supply competition into bulk power markets.
However, by the mid-1980s, limited incentives for QFs in PURPA

had created two types of inefficiencies. First, it was difficult for any
entity but an industrial generator (which could show a useful purpose for
the steam byproduct of the cogeneration process) or a very small
generator (also known as a "small power production" facility) to meet
PURPA's strict size, engineering, fuel use, and ownership criteria for
QFs. Some industrial suppliers continued to ensure a beneficial
regulatory structure by building inefficient generators known as "PURPA
machines"-power-plants which supply only enough thermal energy to
ensure minimum qualification under PURPA's rules.74 PURPA QFs, in
many instances, imposed unnecessary costs on consumers because entities
had structured their projects to maintain exemptions from regulation and,
in some instances, sought inefficient steam hosts to maintain QF status.75
Further, the ability of QFs alone to even the competitive playing field in
bulk power markets were generally limited to states with booming
economies and large industrial bases.76
competition or deregulate rates); see also infra notes 99-101 (discussing continuing
contrasts between the electric and natural gas statutory frameworks).
73.
These criteria, as promulgated by FERC, appear at 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.201.206 (1993).
74.
Lynne C. Capehart & Barney L. Capehart, Efficiency Trends for Industrial
Cogeneration, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Apr. 1, 1991, at 28.
75.
See, e.g., id.; Richard S. Rosenzweig, The Energy Policy Act of 1992, PUB.
UTILS. FORT., Jan. 1, 1993, at 14; see also National Energy Strategy (Pt. 4): Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 10 (1991) [hereinafter Hearings] (prepared statement
of Linda J. Stuntz, Deputy Under Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Energy) (noting "some parties
have asserted that the bulk of the low-cost potential for QF development has already been
tapped . .

.

."); id. at 17, 37 (statement of Cynthia A. Marlette, Associate General

Counsel, Hydroelectric and Electric Power, FERC) ("[Technology and fuel use
restrictions under PURPA limit the amount and type of capacity that could qualify for [QF
status]. The potential for QF capacity is also limited by the growing scarcity of steam
hosts for cogeneration."). But see Peter S. Fox-Penner, Cogeneration After PURPA:
Energy Conservation and Industry Structure, 33 J.L. & ECON. 517, 546 (1990) ("[N]o
analysis has yet quantified the impacts of PURPA on consumer prices, the quality of
service, and structural change.").
76.
See Hearings, supra note 75, at 9 (prepared statement of Linda J. Stuntz,
Deputy Under Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Energy) (noting that most QF development has

1994:763

Redeeming JudicialReview

Second, although FERC had limited authority to lighten the degree
of its regulation of some non-QF NUGs, 7 until 1992 FERC lacked

broad discretion to level competition in bulk power markets, especially
with respect to non-QF NUGs subject to costly Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) jurisdiction under the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935 (PUHCA). 7' NUG power developers ineligible for QF

status under PURPA were forced to utilize convoluted and expensive
corporate structures, often referred to as "PUHCA pretzels," to avoid the
burdensome regulation of PUHCA.
In the Energy Policy Act, Congress attempted to obviate these
inefficiencies by creating a class of PUHCA-exempt wholesale generators
which could be leased or wholly owned by utilities." Prior to passage
of the Energy Policy Act, FERC did not have the statutory authority to
establish, through rulemaking or adjudication, a comprehensive set of
incentives for NUGs to compete with traditional public utilities in the
provision of bulk power supply.'

been limited to 15 states).
FERC's application of light-handed regulation in adjudicative proceedings is
77.
discussed further below.
78.
15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1988). Prior to 1992, the SEC, under PUHCA,
regulated entities exclusively in the business of owning or operating facilities used to
generate power for sale exclusively at wholesale or facilites leased to a public utility.
PUHCA was originally passed in response to popular sentiments that the unbridled growth
of utility holding companies had "given tyrannical power and exclusive opportunity to a
favored few." Message from the President of the U.S., H.R. Doc. No. 137, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1935). President Roosevelt described the holding company empire of 1935
as a "none too benevolent private paternalism." Id. PUHCA's regulatory scheme was
not unwarranted at the time. In the early 1930s, 15 holding companies controlled 80%
of interstate transmission of electricity. Holding companies, built from pyramids of
security issues, deceived public investors of utility stock and overcharged consumers.
"The unknowing investor could purchase what were ostensibly shares in a public utility
but which were in fact shares in a subsidiary that existed on paper alone. The
accumulation of capital and subsidiaries under the name of one parent company created
an oligopoly in the provision of electricity and, as a result, high rates for consumers."
ANNE M. KHADEMIAN, THE SEC AND CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION: THE POLITICS

OF EXPERTISE 46-47 (1992).

79.
Energy Policy Act § 711, 15 U.S.C. § 79z-5a(e) (Supp. IV 1992). The idea
of PUHCA reform originated in the early 1980s, when the Reagan administration
proposed the complete repeal of PUHCA. See U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMM'N, STATEMENT CONCERNING PROPOSALS TO AMEND OR REPEAL THE PUBLIC

UTILITY HOLDINo COMPANY ACT OF 1935 (1982).

80g. FERC's authority to comprehensively "deregulate" NUGs remains imperfect
because, at the state level, most public utility commissions heavily regulate the siting and
retail sales of NUGs.
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C. Statutory Constraintson FERC's Discretion to Require "Open
Access"

Competition in bulk power supply is also not achievable absent open
access to the power grid on competitive terms and conditions. Yet, prior
to late 1992, FERC lacked the statutory authority to provide
comprehensive "open access" for wholesale transmission markets through
rulemaking or adjudication.

If competition is to thrive in bulk power

markets, NUGs and consumers must have access to the essential
transmission facilities which are owned and operated exclusively by
utilities."'
FERC's ability to implement "open access" was severely limited by
Section 211(c)(1) of the FPA, which barred FERC from requiring
wholesale wheeling service "unless the Commission determined that such
order would reasonably preserve existing competitive relationships. " '
The Second Circuit held that section 211 clearly indicated that wheeling
cannot be ordered solely on the basis of the public interest and the

enhancement of competition.'

In addition, the Fifth Circuit rebuked an

effort by FERC to foster competition through mandatory wheeling, noting
that although FERC's goal was "laudable," the agency "is without
authority under the FPA to compel wheeling.""
Following these
decisions, FERC itself interpreted section 211 to "prohibit[] the issuance

of wheeling orders that have a significant procompetitive effect."'
81.
Pierce has argued that competition in bulk power markets cannot thrive absent
access to the power grid on competitive terms and conditions. Pierce, Deregulate, supra
note 69, at 1215-18 ("Every scholar who has analyzed the structure and performance of
the electricity industry has concluded that effective competition cannot exist in the bulk
power market without mandatory equal access to transmission facilities.").
82.
16 U.S.C. § 824j(c) (1988 &'Supp. IV 1992). This section was added to the
FPA by PURPA and was amended by the Energy Policy Act.
83.
New York Elec. & Gas Corp. v. FERC, 638 F.2d 388, 402 (2d Cir. 1980)
("[l]t is clear from the express requirements of §§ 211 and 212 that the public interest and
the enhancement of competition are not alone sufficient justification for compelling
wheeling."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 821 (1981).
84.
Florida Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 660 F.2d 668, 677-79 (5th Cir. 1981)
(reversing FERC order compelling utility to file amended tariff schedule for interchange
transmission service on the basis that the order would impermissibly impose common
carrier status on utility), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1156 (1983).
85.
Southeastern Power Admin., 26 F.E.R.C. 61,127, at 61,323 (1984). This
interpretation limited FERC's wheeling power to address fuel shortage situations or to
promote coordination of electricity among utilities. Southeastern Power Admin., 25
F.E.R.C. 61,204, at 61,539 (1983).
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Subsequently, FERC did not issue a single order requiring procompetitive wheeling.'
In 1991 hearings before the House Subcommittee on Energy and
Power, FERC witnesses spoke in favor of legislative clarification and
expansion of FERC's wheeling authority. 7 Responding to FERC's
"lack of clear authority" under the FPA to require utilities to transmit
power for others, Congress amended the FPA to require FERC to order
wheeling upon petition, where it "is in the public interest, maintains
system reliability, and serves one or more additional goals-including the
promotion of wholesale competition, conservation, efficiency, and the
prevention of discriminatory practices.""6
The Energy Policy Act
broadened section 211 significantly, allowing FERC to grant procompetitive wholesale wheeling requests which satisfy the traditional
public interest standard of the FPA and additional procedural
requirements."
D. The Role of the FPA in ConstrainingFERC's Discretion
In 1988, FERC commenced a series of rulemakings in the electricity
context which addressed competitive bidding,' independent power
producers,9 1 and avoided cost determinations.'
Pierce's article
86.
Pierce has argued that FERC has the authority to mandate open access under
§§ 205 and 206 of the FPA, which contain the "just and reasonable" rate standard.
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Who Will Mandate Open Access to Transmission:FERC or the
Courts?, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 29, 1990, at 28. Pierce's reading of the FPA is based
on the premise that FERC has a comparative advantage in making sound policy in this
area and the general interpretive principle that the FPA should be read in pari materia
with the NGA, which also contains a "just and reasonable" standard. What this argument
ignores is that the NGA contains no analog to §§ 211 and 212 of the FPA, which prior
to passage of the Energy Policy Act had been interpreted by courts to effectively preclude
FERC's mandatory provision of open access. In recent remarks, Pierce has acknowledged
significant jurisdictional differences between the natural gas and electricity contexts over
issues such as retail wheeling, transmission service and conditions, and the construction
and expansion of transmission lines. Dennis Wamsted, Electricity Transmission to Be
Difficult, Painful, Complicatedand Unpredictable-Pierce,THE ENERoY DAILY, May 20,
1994.
87.
H. R. REP. No. 474, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 139 (1992).
88.
Id. at 139-40. "The bill balances the clarification of FERC's transmission
authority by recognizing state and local jurisdiction over siting and environmental
decisions, and by prohibiting FERC from forcing utilities to engage in 'retail wheeling,'
the transmission of power directly to a retail customer." Id. at 140.
89.
Energy Policy Act § 721, 16 U.S.C. § 824 (Supp. IV 1992).
90.
Regulations Governing Bidding Programs, 53 Fed. Reg. 9324 (1988) (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. §§ 35, 293).
91.
Regulations Governing Independent Power Producers, 53 Fed. Reg. 9327
(1988) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. §§ 38, 382).
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correctly predicts that FERC would not complete these rulemakings: in
September 1993, FERC finally put the nail in the coffin of the first two
of these three rulemakings, although it left the third on its agenda for
consideration at some future time." Among the reasons FERC gave for
abandoning these rulemakings were: 1)passage of the Energy Policy Act
and its statutory reforms addressing some of the issues raised in the
proposed rulemakings; 2) the remarkable growth of the independent
power production industry since 1988; 3) the establishment of marketbased pricing on a case-by-case basis; and 4) the growth of state
competitive bidding programs from only a few in 1988 to over thirty in
1993.' There is no evidence that FERC abandoned these rulemakings
because of appellate courts' application of the hard look doctrine, as
Pierce's account suggests. In any event, Pierce concedes that had these
rules alone been promulgated, they would have constituted an "imperfect"
attempt at regulatory reform.95
Pierce clearly has much more comprehensive restructuring of the
industry in mind. For example, he states that FERC is the only
government institution "in a position to create a new regulatory structure
conducive to adequate investment in generating capacity."9 Pierce goes
on to compare FERC's authority to achieve reform as equal in breadth to
Congress'. 7 And in his most passionate plea for reform, he analogizes
FERC's task to Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts to implement perestroika.9 s
However, statutory constraints on FERC's ability to introduce competition
into bulk power markets prior to 1992 precluded such radical reform.
Even after passage of the Energy Policy Act, FERC's jurisdiction to
achieve competitive reforms in the electric utility context remains
imperfect. First, while Congress expanded FERC's authority to mandate
wholesale transmission access, it expressly denied FERC the power to
require access for retail customers.'
Retail access was important to
FERC's policies in making the transition to a competitive structure in the
natural gas industry. FERC had exercised the power to authorize
interstate pipelines to bypass local distribution companies to provide
92.
Qualifying
codified at
93.
94.
95.

96.
97.
98.
99.

Administrative Determination of Full Avoided Costs, Sales of Power to
Facilities, and Interconnection Facilities, 53 Fed. Reg. 9331 (1988) (to be
18 C.F.R. § 292).
See Order Terminating Proceedings, 64 F.E.R.C. 61,364 (1993).
Id. at 63,491.
Pierce, Electricity Crisis, supra note 6, at 9.

Id.at 8.
Id.
Id.at 10.
Energy Policy Act § 722(h), adding 16 U.S.C. § 824k(h) (Supp. IV 1992).
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access for retail end-users, primarily industrial customers.1'° Second,
the FPA's bright-line jurisdictional split between wholesale and retail
transactions, which has no parallel in the natural gas context, makes it
difficult, if not impossible, for FERC alone to allocate the costs of
transmission service among customer classes. Third, FERC lacks
jurisdiction to authorize construction and expansion of transmission lines.
Decisions to build or expand electricity transmission lines remain at the
state and local level. By contrast, FERC has jurisdiction to authorize
construction and expansion of gas pipelines. This jurisdiction preempts
state environmental and statutory laws."'o
Given these statutory constraints, it would be fanciful to expect
FERC to embark on much more systematic or comprehensive rulemaking
than the series it promulgated in 1988. Whether FERC had discretion to
restructure the electric utility industry is a question logically prior to and
doctrinally distinct from the issue of whether FERC's policy choices were
If FERC had interpreted its
appropriate exercises of its discretion."
authority under the FPA more broadly, to allow comprehensive
competitive reforms of the industry through rulemaking, courts would not
have been obligated to defer entirely to FERC's statutory interpretation.
Complete deference to FERC's interpretation of its own discretion under
the FPA would be an abdication of federal courts' responsibility to
contribute to the definition of agency discretion.
In Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, 13 the United States Supreme Court
set forth a deferential approach to agency interpretations of law. After
Chevron, courts are to apply a two-step analysis when reviewing agency
interpretations of law: first, they are to examine whether Congress spoke
"precisely" to the statutory issue in question; and second, they are to
determine whether or not Congress' intent on that issue was
"unambiguously" clear." ° If the statute is silent or ambiguous with
See, e.g., Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. FERC, 955 F.2d 1412 (10th Cir.
100.
1992). Order No. 436 foreshadowed the availability of retail bypass at FERC. 50 Fed.
Reg. at 42,468.
See Louisiana Ass'n of Independent Producers & Royal Owners v. FERC,
101.
958 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
102.
Perhaps this distinction depends upon whether one believes, as Wittgenstein
did, that there is a way of understanding rules which is not an interpretation imposed by
the listener. For a thoughtful discussion of this issue, see the recent exchange between
Dennis Patterson and Stanley Fish. Dennis Patterson, The Poverty of Interpretive
Universalism: Toward the Reconstruction of Legal Theory, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1993);
Stanley Fish, How Come You Do Me Like You Do? A Response to Dennis Patterson,72
TEX. L. REV. 57 (1993); Dennis Patterson, You Made Me Do It: My Reply to Stanley
Fish, 72 TEx. L. REV. 67 (1993).
103.
467 U.S. 837, reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984).
104.
467 U.S. at 843.
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respect to the specific issue, Chevron suggests that courts defer to the
agency's construction so long as it is "permissible." 5 In order to
uphold the agency's interpretation, courts "need not conclude that the
agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have
adopted . . . or even the reading the court would have reached if the

question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.""
Strong Chevron deference would honor agency interpretations of law
even where an agency is discerning the scope of its discretion. This
doctrine is similar to a deferential approach to judicial review in the
constitutional law context known as "Thayer's doctrine"-that courts, in
reviewing the constitutionality of statutes, defer to legislators'
interpretations of the Constitution, even where the Constitution is defining
the legislature's institutional role. A clear error, rather than de novo,
standard applies in reviewing the institution's choices. 7 Just as
Thayer's doctrine requires that courts always to defer to legislators'
understandings of the Constitution, Chevron suggests that courts defer to
agency understandings of the substantive law under which they are
making policy. Thus, assuming deference to an agency's interpretation
of the contours of its own discretion may in effect "Thayerize"
8
Chevron. 10
It would be a mistake, however, to read Chevron as precluding any
role for courts in reviewing FERC's interpretation of its discretion under
substantive law. This Article, written with the benefit of the reams of
pages previously written on Chevron, views strong Chevron deference as
105.
Id.
106.
Id. at 843 n.l1.
107.
Thayer's doctrine holds that legislators are the primary judges of the
constitutionality of the laws they make, and that courts should review challenges to those
laws under a clear error test, rather than de novo. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and
Scope of the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
One commentator has demonstrated a close parallel between Thayer's theory of judicial
review and the Chevron doctrine, although that commentator acknowledges that both
Thayer's doctrine and the strong deference of Chevron have been rejected by the courts.
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Deference to PoliticalDecisionmakers and the PreferredScope of
Judicial Review, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 296 (1993). For a critical examination of the
acceptanee of Thayer's doctrine by academics and jurists, see Mark Tushnet, Thayer's
Target: JudicialReview or Democracy?, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 9 (1993).
108.
In a previous article, Pierce explicitly embraced such an approach. See
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency
Interpretationsof Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 303 (1988) (arguing that
the "strong reading of Chevron is the proper interpretation because agencies are the best
equipped institutions to resolve policy questions in the statutes that grant the agency its
legal power").
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"a siren's song, seductive but treacherous."' ° I reject strong, or
Thayerized, Chevron deference for several reasons."'
First, Chevron involved agency interpretations of a substantive
standard in a statute, not of statutory constraints on the agency's
discretion."1 Chevron did not speak to an agency's construction of the
contours of its discretion; rather, the Court determined whether Congress
had delegated decisionmaking discretion to the agency. The Court was
clear that its decision to defer applied only to the construction of words
which depend "upon more than ordinary language respecting the matters
109.
Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretationand the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. Rv. 452,456 (1989). Similarly spirited oppositions
to strong Chevron deference have been made by Professor Cass Sunstein and Justice
Stephen Breyer. See Kenneth W. Starr et al., JudicialReview of Administrative Action
in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REv. 353, 366-71 (1987) (comments of Sunstein);
Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV.
363, 372-82 (1986).
110.
Theorists of the post-modern persuasion, who have questioned the usefulness
of courts' attempts to formulate rules and policies for general application and apply them
neutrally, might find strong Chevron deference attractive. Cf. ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON,
DwELLING ON THE THRESHOLD: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON MODERN LEGAL THOuGHT 40
(1988) ("The Rule of Law is a sham; the esoteric and convoluted nature of legal doctrine
is an accommodating screen to obscure its indeterminacy and the inescapable element of
judicial choice. Traditional lawyering is a clumsy and repetitive series of bootstrap
arguments and legal discourse is only a stylized version of political discourse."). If these
post-modem theorists are correct, judicial interpretation of the Rule of Law, like many
of the other misguided relics of modernity, such as the plain meaning doctrine or
originalism, should be abandoned.
However, the post-modernist argument for deference is based on misplaced
understandings of interpretation and authority. Only if the Rule of Law is considered as
positivist text, the words of which have fixed meaning, is one compelled to accept a single
institution's interpretation. Especially for the post-modernist, however, such a view
embraces an overly empirical and passive understanding of text. If we instead accept the
practice of judicial review as an application of the tests of tradition which constitute the
Rule of Law, we need not abandon the use of judicial authority as a means of discovering
and applying the Rule of Law in statutory text. The Rule of Law forces us to embrace
a truthful relation to tradition, and to engage in a dialogue about the nature of this
relation. See Francis J. Mootz III, Is the Rule of Law Possible in a Postmodern World?,
68 WASH. L. REv. 249, 305 (1993).
111.
In Chevron, the Court reviewed a regulation promulgated by the EPA which
had interpreted the term "stationary source" under § 172(b)(6) of the Clean Air Act. 42
U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1988) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(5) (Supp. III 1991)).
EPA had adopted a plantwide definition of "stationary source," under which an existing
plant that contained several pollution remitting devices could install or modify one piece
of equipment without meeting its permit conditions if the alteration did not increase total
emissions. EPA's interpretation was the result of its "single bubble" policy, praised by
policy analysts for moving beyond the arcane, command-and-control policy previously
implemented at a single source.
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subjected to agency regulations."' 12 The particular rationales for
deference to EPA's interpretation of that statute were its expertise and its
ability to consider differing points of view from the affected constituency.
The Chevron court made clear that the judiciary retains its role as the
final authority on the issue of whether an agency's statutory construction
is "permissible"; courts must reject interpretations contrary to the plain
language of the statute or clear congressional intent, and need only defer
to agency interpretations where they involve either expertise or more
publicly informed interpretations.113
Second, Thayerization of Chevron is inconsistent with the APA. The
judicial review provisions of the APA recognize a role for courts in
setting aside agency action "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority,
or limitations ..

"I
1..
If the APA's drafters had intended agencies

alone to determine the existence and contours of such jurisdiction,
authority, and limitations, these words would be but dead letters." 5
A third reason against Thayerizing Chevron is that it ignores that the
agency is the regulatory body most likely to be swayed by powerful
interests in the regulated industry. Many regulatory statutes conceived in
the early-twentieth century, including the NGA and FPA, were initially
passed out of legislative distrust of state regulation of monopoly." 6 An
absolute rule of deference in the face of ambiguity would be inconsistent
with Congress' fundamental purpose in passing the FPA-to protect
consumers from monopoly capture of regulation.
A fourth reason is that strong Chevron deference ignores the practical
constraints of language. Ambiguity in legislation is not the same as an
affirmative choice by Congress to delegate decisionmaking discretion to
an agency. Ambiguity in language is often present not by an affirmative
choice on behalf of the speaker, but as a necessary attribute of the limited
112.
467 U.S. at 844 (citations omitted).
Id. at 843 n.9.
113.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
114.
As Sunstein has pointed out, strong Chevron deference is also inconsistent
115.
with Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), because courts possess the
exclusive responsibility to decide issues of law. Starr et al., supra note 109, at 367-68.
116.
According to Professor Ellis Hawley, a leading historian of the 1920s and
1930s:
Too often, it seemed, the local regulatory commissions had degenerated into
"boards of arbitration," agencies that were concerned chiefly with adjusting
private disputes rather than protecting the public. Too often, rate bases had
been inflated and regulation turned into a safe haven for guaranteed profits.
And too often the regulatory agencies had passed under the domination of the
very interests they were supposed to regulate.
ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN

ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE, 325-26 (1966).
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capacity of words to create determinate meanings. 117
Such
indeterminacy is further exacerbated by sloppy or imprecise speaking, a
particular problem that plagues legislation drafted in congressional
committees. To the extent that Chevron elides the distinction between
legislative ambiguity and an affirmative delegation of lawmaking power
to an agency in all circumstances, including where a statute is defining
that agency's discretion, it was decided incorrectly.
Fifth, such a reading of Chevron thwarts separation-of-powers
principles, as conceived by the framers,"' and the contributions of such
principles to legitimacy. According to Professor Cass Sunstein, "[T]he
basic case for judicial review depends on the proposition that foxes should
not guard henhouses."" 9 Historically, it has been widely accepted that
courts should not defer to congressional or state interpretations of
constitutional provisions where there is ambiguity in the constitutional
text.'20 Congress' relation to the Constitution parallels the relation
between regulatory statutes and agencies.
We should not allow
"[i]nstitutions limited by a legal restriction [to] . . . determine the nature
of the limitation, or to decide on its scope."' 2 In such instances, courts
are in a unique position to shed light on the Rule of Law in light of the
congressional purposes behind it. To defer to an agency's interpretation
would be to do violence to the statutory text and the traditions and
purposes which underlie it.12
117.
Q. RONALD DWORKiN, LAW'S EMPIRE 45 (1986).
118.
"The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the
same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." THE FEDERALIST No.
47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
119.
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 143 (1990).

120.
Of course, Thayer's doctrine, discussed supra note 107 and accompanying
text, is the exception.
121.
SUNsTEIN, supra note 119, at 143. Sunstein has denounced Pierce's
understanding of judicial deference because it would apply "in cases involving pure
questions of law in which agency bias or self-dealing is involved." Cass R. Sunstein,
Principles,Not Fictions, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1247, 1251 (1990).
122.
For example, in NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662 (1976), the Supreme Court
struck down FERC's proposed rules designed to eradicate employment discrimination in
the companies it regulates. The Court held that use of the words "public interest" in the
FPA was not "a directive to the Commission to seek to eradicate discrimination, but,
rather, is a charge to promote the orderly production of plentiful supplies of electric
energy ... at just and reasonable rates." Id. at 670. Interpretation of the FPA's "public
interest" standard does not invoke FERC's technical expertise, and it would be absurd to
conclude that usage of these words was an affirmative act of delegation by Congress that
the FERC act to make social policy writ large. The agency is in no better position to
interpret the meaning of these words than a court.
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Those who would Thayerize Chevron bear the burden of showing
why we should extend the case beyond its holding to include deference to
agency interpretations of constraints on the agency's discretion.
Appropriately read, Chevron does not require complete deference to
FERC's interpretation of its discretion under the FPA. Rather, Chevron's
scope should be limited to only those regulatory matters in which
Congress has clearly delegated decisionmaking discretion to the agency's
technical or scientific expertise, or in which the agency is closer to the
relevant viewpoints Congress clearly intended to be considered. Thus,
courts need not afford strong Chevron deference to FERC's interpretation
of its own discretion.
The role of statutory constraints cannot be ignored when examining
the appropriateness of an agency's exercise of discretion. Because
statutory constraints on FERC's discretion have significantly curtailed
FERC's ability to promulgate rules in the electricity context, it is difficult
to attribute regulatory inaction at FERC to judicial review without a
detailed study which takes into account the scope of FERC's jurisdiction.
Yet Pierce's account of judicial review's effects fails to unpack the
possible impact of this "cause" on agency decisionmaking processes and
muddles the distinction between statutory constraints and other possible
"causes," such as judicial review. Pierce's failure to identify and isolate
the influence of non-judicial factors on agency decisionmaking may
foreshadow a more systemic problem with other policy-effect criticisms
of judicial review." z Indeed, other policy-effect studies have also failed
to unpack systematically non-judicial factors which may have influenced
agency decisionmaking. The factor I have discussed in this Part is
statutory constraints as enacted by Congress and interpreted by courts, but
other factors may include congressional oversight, executive oversight,
14
scientific expertise, and public acceptance of the agency's choices.
These studies' failure to separate the influence of different factors
affecting agency decisionmaking may well have led E. Donald Elliott,
former General Counsel of the Environmental Protection Agency, to
remark, "I would take issue with the assertion that we know that the
effects of judicial review on the administrative process and on the internal
deliberations within agencies are huge." 121 Perhaps we should bring an
informed skepticism to these studies before attributing the policy decisions
123.
These policy-effect criticisms are described briefly supra notes 1-5 and
accompanying text.
124.
For further discussion of the relevance of such factors, see Jerry L. Mashaw,
Improving the Environment ofAgency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games, and
Accountability, 57 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 185.

125.
Administrative Law Symposium: Question andAnswer with Professors Elliott,
Strauss, and Sunstein, 1989 DUKE L.J. 551, 553.
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we do not like, or policy inaction, to judicial review. We should proceed
cautiously, examining in detail the regulatory problem at hand, and
hesitate to generalize about judicial review's effects.
III. ELECTRIC UTILITY RESTRUCTURING AT FERC: PRECEDENTIAL
DECISIONMAKING IN ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS

In its strongest form, the policy-effect thesis suggests that applying
the hard look doctrine will result in regulatory paralysis at FERC.
Without competitive reforms through rulemaking, Pierce predicts, "[T]he
nation is virtually certain to confront a serious electricity shortage in the
1990s. "1 I will not dispute this Draconian prediction of blackout in
this Article,' but will focus on the claim, both explicit and implicit in
Pierce's analysis, that application of the hard look doctrine will hamper
altogether regulatory reform at FERC. Regulatory developments at
FERC over the last few years do not support the strong version of the
policy-effect thesis. Rather, these developments suggest that FERC has
made legal- and policy-oriented reforms in adjudicative proceedings, and
thus lend support for a weaker version of Pierce's thesis. Reforms
through adjudication have occurred in two general contexts: transmission
access and increased incentives for NUGs. In addition, following passage
of the Energy Policy Act, FERC has made further reforms in both
adjudicative and rulemaking proceedings.

126.
Pierce, Electricity Crisis, supra note 6, at 19; see also id. at 9 ("rulemaking
is necessary to address the problem.") (emphasis added).
127.
Others in the literature also make this prediction; see, e.g., PETER NAVARRO,
THE DIAMINa OF AMERICA: THE REAL COSTS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATORY
FAILURE (1985).
Navarro's predictions have been chastised for their ideological
presuppositions. Joseph P. Tomain, Book Review, Electricityand Ideology, 7 J. ENERGY
L. & POL'Y 315 (1986). Pierce could, on his theory, also arrive at the opposite
prediction regarding generation capacity. If FERC is too conservative with its regulatory
mechanisms, it is more likely that rates will be too high. Under the status quo utilities
face strong incentives to increase rate base by building new plants, since that is how they
earn a return on investment under cost-of-service regulation. It is not difficult to find data
contesting Pierce's predictions. For example, one comprehensive forecast of supply and
demand predicts that no region will suffer an electricity shortage prior to the year 2000.
EDISON ELEC. INST., MEETING ELECTRICITY NEEDS INTHE 1990s, at 2 (1991); see also
EEl Sees No Shortages, Increasing Reliance on DSM Programsand NUGs, ELEC. UTIL.
WK., Dec. 9, 1991, at 7. The possibility of an electricity shortage varies widely from
area to area, depending upon both capacity and demand forecasts. It also depends on fuel
availability.

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
A. The Development of TransmissionAccess Policy
Despite FERC's narrow jurisdiction under section 211 of the FPA to
require wheeling, in recent years FERC has issued pro-competitive

transmission access orders in the adjudicative context as a voluntary
condition to a benefit or approval conferred under other sections of the
FPA.

For example, FERC has imposed open access transmission terms as
a condition to approval of "market-based" rates1" under its general rate
regulation authority, contained in sections 205 and 206 of the FPA. 1"
FERC intiated this policy with a flexible pricing experiment in bulk
A
power transactions known as the "Southwest Experiment.""p
broader test followed in the Western Systems Power Pool which permitted

flexible pricing not only for bulk power sales, but also for transmission
service."' These experiments have led to the development of a general
market-based pricing policy in a number of adjudicative cases, 32 in
which FERC routinely has required wholesale transmission access as a
condition to its approval of market-based rates. 133 Recently, FERC has
128.
Market-based rates are rates established through a competitive bidding process
or set by a utility deemed by FERC to lack market power or lack barriers to entry, rather
than on the basis of a traditional cost-of-service filing and rate hearing. In theory,
market-based rates should approach the marginal cost of service.
129.
Sections 205 and 206, the basic rate provisions of the FPA, contain the "just
and reasonable" rate standard. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
Under this experiment, utilities made transmission service available more
130.
openly to competitors, and in return had pricing flexibility to sustain this competitive
market. Public Serv. Co. of N.M., 25 F.E.R.C. 61,469, at 62,029-31 (1983).
61,242 (1987) (authorizing
131.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 38 F.E.R.C.
experimental market-based rates with strictly voluntary transmission access), experiment
extended, 47 F.E.R.C. 61,121 (1989) and 50 F.E.R.C. 61,339 (1990), modified sub
61,099, at 61,319 (rejecting further
nom. Western Sys. Power Pool, 55 F.E.R.C.
extension of pricing experiment for bulk power because applicants had failed to mitigate
market power in generation or transmission), granting stay, 55 F.E.R.C. 61,154, reh 'g
61,495, at 62,713-14 (1991) (denying permanent
granted in part, 55 F.E.R.C.
authorization for market-based rates, but allowing capped market-based rates to continue),
61,249 (1992), remanded on other grounds, Environmental
modified, 59 F.E.R.C.
Action, Inc., v. FERC, 996 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1993), order on remand, 66 F.E.R.C.
61,201 (1994) (allowing access for QFs without requiring them to waive their PURPA
rights).
132.
Discussed further infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
133.
See, e.g., Entergy Serv., Inc., 58 F.E.R.C. 61,234, at 61,760-68 (authority
to sell up to 100 megawatts at negotiated rates authorized together with adoption of
transmission service tariffs), order on reh'g, 60 F.E.R.C. 61,168 (1992), rev'd sub
nom. Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 28 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per
curiam); United States Dep't of Energy-Bonneville Power Admin., 53 F.E.R.C. 61,193,
at 61,668 (1990) (market-based rates authorized only because accompanied by
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announced that it will no longer rely solely on a utility's generation
dominance in evaluating requests for market-based rates, but will instead
focus on transmission access." 3
FERC has also used its merger approval authority to develop
transmission policy on a case-by-case basis. In the 1980s, electric utility
mergers increased dramatically and FERC took the opportunity to act on
merger applications. 35 These proceedings have served as an important
vehicle for the development of transmission policy.
FERC has
consistently imposed "open access" transmission terms as a condition to
its approval of mergers under section 203 of the FPA.lM In Utah
Power & Light Co.,1" for example, FERC imposed an absolute duty to
satisfy firm wheeling requests on the merged utility as a condition to its
approval of the merger within five years, even at the expense of increased
costs to native load customers (the "Utah Hammer"). Similar conditions
were imposed on the merged utility in Northeast Utilities Service Co.' 38
and in several other merger cases. 39
transmission access commitments to formerly captive customers); Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind.,
51 F.E.R.C.
61,367 at 62,186, 62,190-204, reh'g granted in part, 52 F.E.R.C.
61,313 (1990) (authorization to sell up to 450 megawatts to unspecified customers at
market-based rates conditioned on system wide access conditions), appeal dismissedfor
lack of ripeness, Northern Ind. Public Service Co., 954 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1992);
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 46 F.E.R.C. 61,390 (market-based rates approved in exchange
for transmission access commitments to formerly captive customer); Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co., 42 F.E.R.C. 61,406 (market-based rates approved in exchange for transmission
access conditions to formerly captive customers), modified, 43 F.E.R.C. 61,403 (1988).
134.
Kansas City Power & Light Co., 67 F.E.R.C. 61,183 (1994).
135.

See UNITED STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ELECTRICITY SUPPLY:

REGULATING UTILITY HOLDING COMPANIES IN A CHANGING ELECTRIC INDUSTRY 4

(1992) (noting that over 53 utilities have been merged with or acquired between 1980 and
1991); Edward Tirello, Consolidation Coming to Industry Says Analyst, ELEC. LIGHT &
POWER, May 1987, at 17-18 (predicting consolidation will occur as a result of continued
increases in competition).
136.
16 U.S.C. § 824b (1988).
137.
47 F.E.R.C.
61,209 (1989) (imposing transmission conditions on
authorization of merger of Pacific Power & Light and Utah Power & Light into
Pacificorp, a large holding company), remanded on other grounds sub nom.
Environmental Action, Inc. v. FERC, 939 F.2d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding
inadequate basis for denying QF access and retail wheeling), order on remand, 57
F.E.R.C. 61,363 (1991).
138.
56 F.E.R.C.
61,269, reh'g granted, 57 F.E.R.C.
61,340 (1991),
modified, 58 F.E.R.C. 61,070, reh'g dismissed as moot, 59 F.E.R.C. 61,089 (1992).
139.
See, e.g., Public Serv. Co. of Col., 58 F.E.R.C. 61,322, at 62,034 (1992)
("Colorado . . . attempted to model the proposed tariff after transmission conditions
imposed or approved by the Commission in other merger cases" including Utah Power
& Light); Kansas Power & Light Co., 56 F.E.R.C. 61,356 (1991) (transmission access
conditions accepted in connection with acquisition settlement); Montana Power Co., 56

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

Many of these conditions were troublesome for traditional utilities in
the industry which owned transmission capacity. The "Utah Hammer"
met sharp criticism by the traditional utility industry and many customer
groups."
In addition, in Northeast Utilities, FERC imposed on the
merging utility an absolute duty to satisfy all requests for transmission
system expansion. ' FERC asserted that "five years is a reasonable
maximum period of time for the merged company to obtain sufficient
additional transmission capacity ... to satisfy all bona fide requests by
other utilities for long-term firm wheeling, as well as its own needs." 2
This condition contradicted the position of the North American Electric
Reliability Council," e as well as FERC's own Transmission Task
Force's determination that completing transmission projects may take as
many as sixteen years.'"
In the Energy Policy Act, Congress removed many of the statutory
restrictions on FERC's wheeling authority in sections 211 and 212 of the
FPA. The Act contains several provisions intended to protect native load
customers, including provisions which ensure that a transmitting utility
will recover the cost of providing wheeling to third parties."
In
addition, the new law requires FERC to terminate or modify a wheeling
order if "the ordered transmission services require enlargement of
transmission capacity and the transmitting utility subject to the order has
failed, after making a good faith effort, to obtain the necessary approvals
or property rights under applicable Federal, State, and local laws.""~
The legislative history of the Energy Policy Act also raises ambiguity
47
regarding the "Utah Hammer." 1
F.E.R.C.
61,296 (1991) (conditioning merger authorization in part on modified
transmission access provisions).
140.
See FERC Okays NUIPSNH Merger; Imposes New Transmission Access
Conditions, ELECTRIC UTiL. WK., Aug. 5, 1993, at 1.
141.
56 F.E.R.C. 61,269, at 62,022-24 (1991) (overruling administrative law
judge's due diligence exception and requiring applicant to satisfy all requests for firm
transmission service within five years).
142.
Id.
143.
NORTH AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY COUNCIL, RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT 19912000: THE FUTURE OF BuLK ELECTRICITY SYSTEM RELIABILITY IN NORTH AMERICA 23
(1991).
144.
FERC TRANSMISSION TASK FORCE, THE TRANSMISSION TASK FORCE'S
REPORT TO THE COMMISSION 39-43 (1989).
145.
Energy Policy Act of 1992, § 722(1), 106 Stat. 2776 (1992) (establishing new
§ 212(a)).
146.
Id. § 721(5)(D), 106 Stat. 2776 (1992) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824j(d)(1)(C)
(Supp. IV 1992)).
147.
Some of the conferees asserted that they were repealing the "Utah Hammer."
See 138 CONG. REC. S17,617 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (statement of Sen. Wallop)
(interpreting "good faith" exemption from wheeling order and stating that "[u]nder the
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Since passage of the Energy Policy Act, at least nine requests for
wholesale transmission service have been filed with FERC." Despite
a spirited opposition by the utility industry, FERC's initial treatment of

these requests has erased any remaining doubt that it would, in certain
circumstances, use its new authority under section 211 to push the
industry towards open access and increased competition. 49
In a watershed decision issued in October 1993, FERC voted
unanimously to require Florida Power & Light (FP&L) to provide
network transmission service to members of the Florida Municipal Power

Agency. 1"

Interpreting its new authority broadly, FERC noted that

section 21 l(c)(2) of the FPA did not bar issuance of a wheeling order due
to pre-existing transmission contracts, effectively allowing existing

transmission customers the opportunity to "upgrade" the service they
received under existing contracts."' Given the FPA's purpose of
"encourag[ing]
the orderly development of plentiful supplies of
provisions of the Conference Report, the FERC cannot legally re-institute the so-called
'hammer clause' of the Utah Power & Light-Pacificorpmerger"). The House proponents
of transmission access, however, generally praised FERC's transmission pricing policies
as established in the Northeast Utilities decision. See 138 CoNe. REc. H 1,413 (daily
ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (colloquy between Reps. Moorhead and Sharp).
148.
See, e.g., Tex-La Elec. Coop., 58 Fed. Reg. 6632 (1993) (request for an
order requiring Texas Utilities Electric Company to provide transmission service); City
of Bedford, 58 Fed. Reg. 34,576 (1993) (request for order requiring provision of
transmission service by operation companies of the American Electric Power Company,
Inc., system); Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 58 Fed. Reg. 39,808 (1993) (request for order
requiring Upper Peninsula Power Company to provide transmission service to isolated
Greenstone service area) (request withdrawn for purposes of negotiation); Florida Mun.
Power Agency, 58 Fed. Reg. 38,123 (1993) (request for order requiring transmission
service from Florida Power & Light); Minnesota Mun. Power Agency, 58 Fed. Reg.
58,546 (1993) (request for order requiring service from Northern States Power for
purposes of purchasing power off-system from United Power Association, a generation
and transmission cooperative).
149.
See City of Bedford, 64 F.E.R.C. 61,381 (1993) (setting proceeding for
expedited hearing for purposes of determining meaning of electric service agreements);
Tex-La Elec. Coop., 64 F.E.R.C. 61,162 (1993) (interpreting the term "transmission
service" in § 211 broadly, but denying Tex-La's request because it sought a remedy for
a generation billing dispute).
150.
Florida Mun. Power Agency, 65 F.E.R.C. 61,125 (1993) (granting request
for transmission service as establishing further proceedings to investigate the rates, terms,
and conditions of such service). Florida Municipal Power Agency is a bulk power agency
representing 26 municipal utility members throughout the state of Florida, who sought to
transmit power across the transmitting utility's system from generators in which they own
interests used to meet a portion of their customers' needs. Id. at 61,599.
151.
Id. at 61,614 (rejecting utility's argument that pre-existing transmission
service agreements bar issuance of a wheeling order).
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electricity .. at reasonable prices,"' 52 FERC found the public interest
in favor of issuance of a wheeling order to be compelling under the
circumstances:
As a general matter, the availability of transmission service (or
increased flexibility to use transmission) will enhance
competition in the market for power supplies over the long run
because it will increase both the power supply options available
to transmission customers (thereby benefiting their customers)
and the sales options available to sellers. This should result in
lower costs to consumers. In addition, if a transmission
customer determines that flexible service, such as network
service, will allow it to serve its customers more efficiently, we
believe that the public interest will be served by requiring that
service to be provided so long as the transmitting utility is fully
and fairly compensated and there is no unreasonable impairment
of reliability.153
FERC's order emphasized that the rates, terms, and conditions under
which the service is offered must be nondiscriminatory and comparable
to what the utility provides other customers." This represents the first
step in imposing on the industry the "comparability" standard FERC had
adopted in the natural gas context.'55 This precedent-setting decision
was widely recognized by industry experts as a clear message that FERC
was serious about "leveling the competitive playing field" between
transmission users and transmission-owning utilities." s FERC has
continued to adopt competitive transmission mechanisms by requiring
152.
Id. at 61,615 (citing NAACP v. FERC, 425 U.S. 662, 669-70 (1975))
(purpose of FPA is to assure the abundant supply of electric energy throughout the United
States with the greatest possible economy).
153.
Id.
154.
FERC stated:
If Florida Power seeks to charge a rate for network service that exceeds what
it charges for point-to-point service, it must provide the information necessary
for us to determine that such a charge is justified. Florida Power's rates,
charges, terms and conditions for this network service must not be unduly
discriminatory when compared to rates, charges, terms and conditions of
transmissions [sic] used to serve Florida Power's other customers and must
meet the other requirements of section 212(a).
Id. at 61,613.
61,293, at 62,205 (1991)
155.
See, e.g., ANR Pipeline Co., 56 F.E.R.C.
(requiring pipeline to offer natural gas transportation service customers transportation
service comparable to firm sales customers).
156.
See FERC, In a Precedent-Setting Decision, Orders Network Service,
Comparability, ELEC. UTIL. WK., Nov. 1, 1993, at 1, 14.
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transmission to the distribution level 57 and requiring the open access
tariffs filed in merger proceedings to provide network service. 5 '
B. Competition-EnhancingBulk Power Reforms
In addition, FERC has, in adjudicative proceedings, created limited
pro-competitive incentives for NUGs in bulk power markets. FERC has
developed policies of approving market-based rates and, in limited
circumstances, lightening the regulatory burden on NUGs. FERC's NUG
policy, as developed in ad hoc adjudicative proceedings, has decreased the
regulatory burden on NUGs and given them additional incentives for
entering power generation markets.
FERC has exempted non-QF Independent Power Producers (IPPs)
from its traditional cost-of-service rate regulation by approving IPP
market-based rate schedules.'"
In limited instances, FERC has
approved IPP market-based rates established through competitive bidding
without any substantive discussion of market power.1 " Since 1988,
FERC has acted on over fifty requests, many by IPPs, for market-based
rates. 6' The availability of market-based rates allows power generators
and affiliated entities to avoid the regulatory burdens of filing an extensive
157.
Tex-La Electric Coop. of Texas, Inc., 67 F.E.R.C. 61,019 (1994).
158.
American Electric Power Service Corp., 67 F.E.R.C. 61,168 (1994).
159.
See, e.g., Dartmouth Power Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 53 F.E.R.C. 61,117,
at 61,359-60 (1990) (affirming market-based rates because applicant lacked market power
in generation or transmission); Enron Power Enter. Corp., 52 F.E.R.C.
61,193, at
61,708-09, 61,711 (1990) (accepting market-based rates because no potential existed for
self-dealing and applicant lacked market power over generation and transmission);
Commonwealth At. Ltd. Partnership, 51 F.E.R.C.
61,368, at 62,244-46 (1990)
(affirming market-based rates because no potential for self-dealing was present, and
applicant was not dominant supplier and neither owned nor operated any transmission
facilities other than interconnection capacity in the relevant market); Chicago Energy
Exch., 51 F.E.R.C. 61,054, at 61,112 (1990) (approving market-based rates because
applicant did not own generation facilities or control transmission facilities directly or
indirectly); National Elec. Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 50 F.E.R.C. 61,378, at 62,156-57
(1990) (accepting market-based rates for power brokering because no potential for selfdealing abuse existed, and because applicant owned no generation or transmission facilities
and was not affiliated with entity that controlled transmission); Doswell Ltd. Partnership,
50 F.E.R.C. 61,251, at 61,757-58 (1990) (approving request for market-based pricing
because applicant was not dominant in generation and was not directly or indirectly in
control of transmission); Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc., 42 F.E.R.C.
61,012, at
61,028-29 (1988) (approving market-based rates for purchase from IPPs). See also supra
notes 132-34; Hearings, supra note 75, at 32-36 (statement of Cynthia A. Marlette)
(summarizing market-based pricing requests to date).
160.
See, e.g., Wallkill Generating Co., L.P., 56 F.E.R.C. 61,067 (1991).
161.
For a discussion of these proceedings, see Order Terminating Proceedings,
supra note 93, at 63,491.
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cost-of-service analysis and undergoing a rate hearing at FERC prior to
rate approval.
In order to encourage further development of IPPs, FERC has also
found ways to exempt entities in competitive markets from certain
burdensome regulatory requirements, subjecting such entities to what is
often called "light-handed" regulation. One way in which FERC can
"waive" its costly reporting and cost-of-service requirements is by making
a finding, on the basis of statutory interpretation, that an entity is not a
"public utility" within the meaning of section 201(e) of the FPA. 12 In
Bechtel Power Corp., for example, FERC exempted an engineering
firm involved with the day-to-day operations of a 633 megawatt IPP from
FERC regulation as a "public utility" under section 201(e) of the FPA,
including rate, cost-of-service, and reporting requirements. In reasoning
that Bechtel, which coordinated day-to-day operation and maintenance of
the facility under an agreement with the owner, did not "own or operate"
jurisdictional facilities, FERC noted that Bechtel had no control or
decisionmaking authority concerning the sale or transmission of electric
energy from the IPP project, so "no regulatory purpose would be served
by asserting jurisdiction. .... ""'
FERC has also, in limited circumstances on a case-by-case basis,
temporarily waived PURPA regulations for QFs. 11 In Kramer Junction
Co., the Commission granted solar-powered QFs a temporary waiver
of a regulation which limited fossil fuel use by small power production
facilities to twenty-five percent in order to allow the QFs to increase their
use of natural gas-fired generation during a 120 day period in 1992.167
In a series of decisions, FERC began to standardize its criteria for
granting cogenerators temporary waivers of operating and efficiency
regulations during initial startup and testing." u FERC granted waivers
162.
The statutory term "public utility" triggers jurisdiction for many requirements
underpart II of the FPA. 16 U.S.C. § 824 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
163.
60 F.E.R.C. 61,156 (1992).
164.
Id. at 61,573.
165.
See generally Rossi, supra note 16. For a thoughtful discussion of how
waiving rules through a case-by-case exceptions process can undermine the administrative
values enhanced by rulemaking, see Peter H. Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the
Rule: Regulatory Equity and the Formulation of Energy Policy Through an Exceptions
Process, 1984 DuKE L.J. 163.
166.
61 F.E.R.C. 61,309 (1992).
167.
Id. at 62,160 (noting that granting the waiver would encourage application
of novel technologies, whereas denial "would send the wrong signal to potential
developers of facilities powered by solar resources").
168.
See, e.g., O.L.S. Energy Agrems, Inc., 61 F.E.R.C. 61,293 (1992); KES
Kingsburg, L.P., 59 F.E.R.C. 62,279 (1992); Hadson Power 12-Altavista, 59 F.E.R.C.
62,167 (1992).
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in these decisions on public interest grounds, citing to factors such as the
limited duration of the waiver request, the fact that noncompliance was
during testing and thus further waiver would be unnecessary, and that
waiver would fulfill PURPA's goal of encouraging cogeneration."t
More recent decisions, however, suggest that future waiver requests will
face a heavier burden.17°
In part due to FERC's development of legal- and policy-oriented
incentives in an adjudicative context, the presence of NUGs has increased
dramatically in the past few years. 17 NUGs now account for more than
half of all planned generating capacity."
The growth of the NUG
industry poses a formidable layer of bulk power supply competition,
chiseling away at the monopoly of traditional public utilities over power
generation.
C. Revisiting the Policy-Effect Theses
In adjudicative proceedings, FERC has systematically made policy
by requiring transmission access as a condition to its approval of utility
market-based rate and merger applications. FERC's willingness to
address transmission issues in the adjudicative context has allowed it to
develop knowledge and expertise on a complex technical issue which
regulation must address prior to the implementation of competition in bulk
power markets. Further, FERC has developed policy and law on a
systematic basis in its approval of IPP market-based rates and lighthanded regulation for NUGs.
The legal- and policy-oriented principles pronounced in these
adjudicative proceedings concerning transmission access and NUGs have
precedential value. For utilities, IPP developers, and consumers, these
principles have created expectations and have influenced subsequent
169.
KES Kingsburg, L.P., 59 F.E.R.C. at 63,618.
170.
Dagget Leasing Corp., 64 F.E.R.C. 61,148, order on reh'g, 65 F.E.R.C.
61,143 (1993). Applying this heavier standard, FERC has refused to grant one such
waiver. New Charleston Power, 64 F.E.R.C.
61,378 (1993), order on reh'g, 66
F.E.R.C. 61,221 (1994) (refusing to grant request from developer of 15-MW manurefired facility to waive fuel use requirements). For criticism of this higher level of scrutiny
for QF waiver requests, see Rossi, supra note 16.
171.
Bechtel: NUGs Capture Dominant Share of Growing Market for Baseload
Power, INDEPEDENT PowER REP., July 16, 1993, at 6.
172.
See id. (noting that NUGs occupied a 60% share of marginal capacity in bulk
power markets in 1992, and are expected to supply at least half of the new generating
capaety over the next ten years); David Step, Utility Deregulation Sparks Competition,
Jolting Electric Firms, WALL ST. J., June 30, 1992, at 1A (stating that NUGs occupy
more than half of planned capacity).
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regulatory filings, purchase decisions, and investments." Thus, in the
minds of market decisionmakers in the industry, these policies have the
same status and practical and binding effect as rules, even though many

who have been affected by them did not participate in their
formulation.174
Given the precedential nature of these general policies, however, it
perhaps would have been preferable for FERC to have developed them
through rulemaking rather than adjudicative proceedings. In addition to
its other inherent and procedural advantages over adjudication,17
rulemaking would have allowed those bound by precedent to have some
participation in formulating the law and policy decisions which bind them.
Many constraints on FERC's ability to make further regulatory
reforms on these issues, I have suggested, had their source in the FPA,
not the hard look doctrine. 76 Even if we could determine with
certainty that application of the hard look doctrine had some effect on
FERC's internal decisionmaking choices, the transmission access and IPP
examples suggest that judicial review has not deterred FERC from
voluntarily adopting systematic pro-competitive regulatory reforms on a
case-by-case basis. Application of the hard look doctrine has not led to
complete regulatory stalemate, as the strong form of Pierce's thesis would
173.
Many utilities filing for merger or market-based rate approval, for instance,
have voluntarily proposed tariffs which include the open access conditions imposed by
FERC in previous cases. See, e.g., Public Serv. Co. of Col., 58 F.E.R.C. 61,322, at
62,034 (1992) (noting that merging utility modeled proposed transmission tariff after
conditions imposed by FERC in previous merger cases). The anticipated availability of
transmission access on merged systems or systems offering market-based rates has caused
some transmission-dependent customers to enter into contracts for purchasing power offsystem.
Undoubtedly, FERC's approach to market-based rates and light-handed
regulatory policies directed towards some IPPs have affected utility decisions to invest in
and build their own generating capacity. See Barry J. Moline, Prospecting for Energy,
PUB. POWER, Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 19.
174.
Commissioner Trabandt, in his partial dissent to FERC's decision in Utah
Power & Light Co., 47 F.E.R.C.
61,209 (1989) (discussed supra note 137 and
accompanying text), noted that the transmission access conditions adopted in that
adjudicative proceeding "have no precedential status or weight in any subsequent
proceeding." Id. at 61,758 (Trabandt, Comm'r, dissenting). He referenced a letter from
Senator J. Bennett Johnston, of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S.
Senate (Dec. 20, 1988), which "strongly urge[d] the Commission (most importantly) to
clarify that there is no precedential effect to whatever specific conditions it may place
upon the merger." Id. (Trabandt, Comm'r, dissenting in part). Although the majority
explicitly disclaimed any precedential impact of its decision, id. at 61,733, the decision
was treated as if it had precedential effect by utilities which subsequently filed merger
applications and transmission tariffs with FERC, as well as by FERC itself in subsequent
merger and transmission tariff proceedings.
175.
See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
176.
See supra part II.
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suggest. FERC's development of reforms in adjudicative proceedings
should lead us to reject this form of Pierce's thesis.
In the shadow of court applications of the doctrine, FERC has found
ways to innovate and achieve many pro-competitive reforms in

adjudicative proceedings. FERC's consistent willingness to implement
pro-competitive reforms in adjudicative proceedings does lend support to
a weaker reading of Pierce's thesis: the hard look doctrine may increase
the perceived costs to FERC of policy innovation through rulemaking,
and thus may cause FERC to implement competitive regulatory
transformation in an adjudication context, even where it may have been
more efficient to pursue such reform through rulemakings. 1'
Fueled by the Energy Policy Act, FERC initiated several efforts to
systematically reform the electric utility industry in 1993, despite vigorous
protest from traditional electric utilities. Two of these rulemakings were
prescribed by the Energy Policy Act. 7 ' FERC has, however, gone
beyond the Energy Policy Act's mandate and voluntarily initiated

rulemakings and generic policy inquiries on several additional issues.'
177.
Although Pierce correctly predicts that hard look review may increase
FERC's tendency to resolve difficult policy issues through adjudication (Pierce, Electricity
Crisis, supra note 6, at 27), his consistent invocation of a stronger, more apocalyptic
version of the policy-effect thesis weakens this insight.
178.
In an aggressive rulemaking, which for the first time takes some of the
guesswork out of transmission access issues, FERC required transmission-owning utilities
to make publicly available previously confidential information regarding transmission
capacity and usage. New Reporting Requirement Implementing Section 213(b) of the
Federal Power Act and Supporting Expanded Regulatory Responsibilities Under the
Energy Policy Act of 1992, 58 Fed. Reg. 52,240 (1993) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. §
141). FERC completed this rulemaking, which the Energy Policy Act required to be
completed by October 24, 1993 (FPA § 213(b), 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (Supp. IV 1992)),
despite a spirited opposition by the utility industry. The Energy Policy Act also required
FERC to promulgate a rulemaking implementing new PUHCA § 32 by October 24, 1993,
one year after enactment. 15 U.S.C. 79z-5a(a)(1). To the surprise of many, FERC
promptly formulated a final rule within months of the Act's passage. Filing Requirements
and Ministerial Procedures for Persons Seeking Exempt Wholesale Generator Status, 58
Fed. Reg. 8897 (1993) (corrected at 58 Fed. Reg. 11,886) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R.
§§ 365, 381).
179.
In the most aggressive of these, FERC commenced a transmission pricing
inquiry, which will address pricing standards under open access transmission. Inquiry
Concerning the Commission's Pricing Policy for Transmission Services Provided by
Public Utilities Under the Federal Power Act, 58 Fed. Reg. 36,400 (proposed July 7,
1993). FERC also issued a policy statement regarding regional transmission groups,
voluntary associations of transmission owners and users established for planning,
coordination, and operation purposes. Policy Statement Regarding Regional Transmission
Groups, 58 Fed. Reg. 41,626 (1993) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. § 2). (FERC issued a
policy statement rather than a rulemaking on this issue because it lacked statutory
authority to require regional transmission groups and it perceived a need for flexibility in
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If judicial review of FERC's natural gas rulemaking immediately
following passage of the NGPA is any indication," m courts will be
likely to defer to FERC's expertise in promulgating these initial rules as
an agency's interpretation of a recently enacted statute. Thus, the time
is ripe for FERC to engage in more comprehensive rulemaking to
restructure the electric utility industry.
Whether reviewing court applications of the hard look doctrine have
delayed or slowed the development of regulatory reform at FERC is an
empirical question that, absent further study, cannot be answered."'

But any theory of judicial review's effects on FERC's policy choices must
be able to explain two anomalies in FERC's decisionmaking practice.
First, although FERC did not complete the 1988 series of rules in the
electric utility context, it did promulgate its final rule to restructure the

natural gas industry. Furthermore, in 1993 FERC promulgated several
rules and initiated policy inquiries in the electric utility context."
Pierce's account does not explain these rulemaking efforts. Second, as
Pierce acknowledges, FERC has traditionally opted to make its policy
choices through adjudication rather than rulemaking.'1 It thus seems
addressing different geographic, historical, and operational scenarios.) In addition, FERC
initiated and completed a series of ministerial and procedural rulemakings as a first step
in implementing the Energy Policy Act. See, e.g., Policy Statement Regarding Good
Faith Requests for Transmission Services, 58 Fed. Reg. 38,964 (1993) (to be codified at
18 C.F.R. § 2); Provisions for Applications for Transmission Service Under Section 211
of the Federal Power Act, 58 Fed. Reg. 57,735 (1993) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt.
36); see also Electronic Filing of FERC Form No. 1 and Delegation to Chief Accountant,
58 Fed. Reg. 40,606 (1993) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. §§ 141, 375, 385).
180.
See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
181.
Other than reference to natural gas adjudicative proceedings in the 1970s,
Pierce gives no evidence of delay. He only speculates skeptically that such delay will
occur in electric utility adjucative proceedings. Pierce, Electricity Crisis, supra note 6,
at 12-13. Indeed, adjudication in the electric utility context may well differ from the
natural gas context because of jurisdictional limitations which restrict the number of
potential issues to be addressed and the limited number of affected parties in electric
utility adjudications. Compare Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Adjudicating
and Rulemaking for Formulating and Implementing Energy Policy, 31 HAST. L.J. 1, 7
(1979) (noting that in major natural gas curtailment adjudicative proceedings litigation
ranged from four to nine years, with hearings ranging from 48 to 194 days) with U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ELECTRICITY REGULATION FACTORS AFFECTING THE
PROCESSING OF ELECTRIC POWER APPLICATIONS, REPORT TO THE CHARIMAN,
ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY, AND NATURAL RESOURCE SUBCOMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 5 (1993) (processing time

for market-based rate and jurisdictional applications during 1990-92 averaged 169 days;
contested applications set for a trial-type hearing averaged 2.8 years prior to completion).
182.
See supra notes 58, 178-79 and accompanying text.
183.
Pierce, Electricity Crisis, supra note 6, at 18.
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odd to attribute to the hard look doctrine, which developed in the 1960s
and 1970s, a practice which existed prior to its application." '
In addition to these anomalies, FERC's experiences in making policy
through adjudication may have been more successful than ad hoc attempts
in other agency contexts, such as EPA, OSHA, or NHTSA, for several
reasons. 1" First, FERC, in its prior incarnation as the Federal Power
Commission, was originally designed as an adjudicative agency, not as an
agency intended to promulgate broad substantive rules. Designed as such,
FERC's adjudicative discretion was defined broadly. 1"
Second, FERC's historically adjudicative function allowed it to
develop technical expertise and made it much more astute in the exercise
of its adjudicative function than younger agencies. 18 7 For its first fifty
years, FERC issued virtually no rules at all. Licensing and rate
proceedings, not generic rulemakings, were FERC's historical
decisionmaking mechanisms. In such proceedings, FERC was forced to
focus on specific, highly technical factual scenarios and was able to
develop much of the expertise necessary to effectively regulate a complex
industry. FERC is currently struggling to develop policies for the pricing
of transmission services on a case-by-case basis. Through concrete cases,
FERC can best decide which policies are suited to current technological,
regulatory, and market conditions.
FERC's experiences in such
proceedings may have allowed it to develop an intra-agency process for
making prospective rules through adjudication. By contrast, younger
184.
Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly enunciate the doctrine until the
State Farm case in 1983, discussed supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text, it had
previously been adopted by several lower courts, beginning with Judge Leventhal's
decision in Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
185.
Studies of the EPA, OSHA, and NHTSA are described briefly at supra notes
1-3 and accompanying text. The FTC (referenced supra note 4), unlike these other
agencies, was designed as an adjudicative agency and bears historical similarities to
FERC. The same could be said of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the National
Labor Relations Board, and the Federal Communications C6mmission.
186.
Professor Jerry Mashaw has suggested that many other agencies, such as
NHTSA, do not have broad discretion to make precedent through adjudication, as does
FERC. NHTSA was established by Congress as a rulemaking agency to force the
technology of automobile safety design. MASHAW & HARFST, STRUGGLE FOR AUTO
SAFETY, supra note 3, at 10. NHTSA's adjudicative mechanism was the recall, which
Congress intended to be limited in use. FERC, in contrast, was designed to determine
"just and reasonable" rates after an adjudicative hearing: Congress thus intended FERC's
adjudicative function to be used more broadly, to include pronouncements of prospective
policy.
187.
NHTSA, for example, was established in 1966. Id. at 4. OSHA, EPA, and
the Consumer Product Safety Commission were also created in the 1960s and early 1970s.
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agencies, such as EPA, OSHA, and NHTSA, could not draw on the same

base of historically-developed institutional expertise and procedural
sophistication.
Third, most of FERC's regulatory efforts have been concerned with
"deregulation" and re-regulation, not with developing and implementing
an initial regulatory structure for the industry. While adjudication may
be an inefficient and ineffective methodology for implementing new
regulatory programs at EPA, OSHA, and NHTSA, it may have proved
itself more efficient and effective for FERC's recent regulatory project of
undoing and revising existing rules and policies to implement competitive
reforms."'s
IV.

REDEEMING JUDICIAL REVIEW: CONGRESS, AGENCIES, THE

COURTS-AND THE AFFIRMATION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRATIC

VALUES

Accepting a weaker version of Pierce's thesis is not alone sufficient
to condemn the hard look doctrine. Because of the manner in which
appellate courts have applied judicial review,189 and the potential effects
of such review on FERC policymaking,'" Pierce recommends limiting
the discretion of lower courts to invoke the hard look doctrine. One way

of restricting the judicial threat to agency policymaking prescribed by
Pierce is that the Supreme Court implement doctrinal changes restricting
the scope of the adequate consideration doctrine. 191
188.
See Schuck, supra note 165 (examining how case-by-case exceptions process
allowed agency to undermine effectively existing rules without the visibility and costs of
formal rulemaking processes).
189.
See supra part I.B.
190.
See supra part I.C.
191.
Pierce, Electricity Crisis, supra note 6, at 29. Although narrow in scope,
Supreme Court decisions in two recent cases have imposed some limitations on judicial
review. In Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990), the
Court held that the "plain language" of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA) required PBGC to consider only the policies and goals of ERISA, and not
policies and goals advanced by other statutes governing bankruptcy and labor law. The
Court's restriction was pragmatic: the plethora of statutes which touch upon any one
agency's decision may, if invoked by a reviewing court, lead to mass judicial invalidation
of agency decisions. Id. at 646. Notably, the Court did not restrict judicial review of
PBGC's implementation of ERISA in isolation of other statutes.
In Mobil Oil Exploration v. United Distrib. Co., 498 U.S. 211 (1991) (holding that
FERC Order No. 451 does not exceed FERC's authority under the NGPA), the Court
held that an agency that chooses to solve one problem in a rule is not required to address
related problems in the same rulemaking, even if its attempt to solve one problem
increases the severity or urgency of related problems. The Court, citing Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978),
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This Part argues that Pierce makes this recommendation without
considering two important aspects of the hard look doctrine: (1) interinstitutional effects outside of the agency, particularly incentives for
policy choice; and (2) the affirmation of deliberative democratic values.
Failure to consider these aspects of judicial review has led policy-effect
critics generally to adopt an overly narrow understanding of judicial
review's benefits. A fuller account, I argue, can redeem judicial review
from the myopic, anti-democratic role many of these critics have
attributed to it.
A. Inter-InstitutionalEffects: CongressionalChoice
Pierce denounces the hard look doctrine solely on the basis of its
effects within FERC. A public choice analysis would suggest a broader
study of judicial review's effects. Public choice theory recognizes that,
due to the effect of interest groups, reviewing court decisions may have
an impact on policymaking by institutions beyond the agency subject to
To understand the public choice effects of the hard look
review."
doctrine, we must not limit our analysis of the effects to the agency
subject to review. In addition, we must ask the following question: what
were the effects of judicial review on interest group pressure upon other
policymaking bodies, such as Congress or the states?
In certain instances, it may be preferable for institutions other than
agencies to make policy. One such instance is the definition of an
agency's discretion. When an agency's discretion is being expanded, an
agency will likely push in favor of broadening its jurisdiction. Congress,
a generally more accountable body responsible for legislative structures
governing the interrelationship between agencies, is generally the best
decisionmaking body to specify the terms of an agency's expansion. Such
expansion should be done through legislation, not agency decisionmaking.
As discussed above,' courts should play an integral role in interpreting
the statutory terms which define the contours of such discretion.
At the time Pierce wrote his article, Congress' ability to pass procompetitive legislation in the'electricity context was highly uncertain and
concluded unanimously that agencies have broad discretion "in determining how best to
handle related, yet discrete, issues in terms of procedures... and priorities." Id. at 230.
Public choice is generally accepted to mean the application of economics to
192.
political decisionmaking. In its simplest formulation, a public choice model would
analyze the behavior of those who stand to benefit from a political decision and how these
constituencies have an impact on the dynamics of the decisionmaking process, operating
within the institutional constraints of the existing political system. For a good general
background survey, see DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11 (1989).
193.
See supra part l.D.
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politically volatile.

'

In late 1992, Congress overcame its nearly

fifteen-year stalemate to pass the Energy Policy Act, which significantly

broadened FERC's authority to require wheeling under section 211 of the
FPA and created a class of PUHCA-exempt wholesale generators."
Reviewing court applications of the hard look doctrine may have had an

effect on congressional choice by playing an agenda-setting role and
helping to nudge passage of the Energy Policy Act.
A public choice account of the effects of the hard look doctrine might

go something like this: because of a very constrained statutory
framework"" and a lack of technical knowledge, 1" FERC was unable
194.
At the time he wrote his article in late 1990, Pierce believed that Congress
was impotent to make major changes in regulatory policy. Pierce, Electricity Crisis,
supra note 6, at 8-9.
195.
For a good survey of the history and substance of the Energy Policy Act, see
Jeffrey D. Watkiss & Douglas W. Smith, The Energy Policy Act of 1992-A Watershed
for Competition in the Wholesale Power Market, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 447 (1993). The
Energy Policy Act's history is discussed in Jim Rossi, Lessons from the Politics and
Procedureof the "Comprehensive"NationalEnergy PolicyAct of 1992, 19 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. (forthcoming 1995).
196.
Unlike the natural gas industry, which Congress gave FERC a broad mandate
to deregulate in the NGPA (see supra note 32 and accompanying text), FERC did not
have broad discretion to deregulate the electricity industry. FERC's discretion to
restructure the electricity industry was curtailed under the FPA by detailed "bright-line"
jurisdictional separation between state and federal jurisdiction, restrictions on FERC's
ability to require "open access" transmission service, and limited FERC jurisdiction over
NUGs. See Robert J. Michael, Reason for Pessimism: Politics and Policy Cloud the
Future of Electricity Competition, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 15, 1993, at 16; see also
Stalon & Lock, supra note 32; supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
197.
FERC understood the basic technical, engineering, and operational principles
behind gas pipelines. Under open access, gas pipelines continue to operate on the same
basic principles. Natural gas will only move through a pipeline if the pipeline places
pressure behind it and can be controlled by the usage of valves; thus, it is possible to
identify specific buyers and sellers under an open access natural gas system. Electricity
transmission lines, on the other hand, lack "valves" to control flow in the transmission
grid. It is difficult, if not impossible, to pair specific buyers and sellers on the grid. The
technical and operational complexities of electricity transmission are multiplied on a
connected grid under open access. Electrons, following Kirchoff's laws, move in the path
of least resistance. Once a generator plugs into the grid, it affects transmission elsewhere.
Thus, open access in the electricity context raises all types of control problems, such as
impacts on reliability, which have no analog in the natural gas context and which have
never been addressed in a regulatory forum. The traditional regulatory model encouraged
firms to deal with these coordination problems through vertical integration c, generation,
transmission and distribution. See William W. Hogan, Electric Transmission: A New
Modelfor Old Principles,ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 1, 1993, at 18. Where knowledge and
expertise are lacking, it may be appropriate for regulators to choose to tackle problems
of this complexity in isolated contexts, rather than experiment with the industry through
mega-rulemakings. Once regulators have developed and tested their knowledge and
expertise, the time may be more ripe for them to implement a mega-rule.
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to restructure the electric utility industry to be competitive through a
comprehensive mega-rulemaking, as it did in the natural gas context.
Thus, FERC initiated a series of fragmented rulemakings addressing
easily-grasped, narrow issues within its statutory power, such as
competitive bidding"w and IPPs. 1
However, constituent groups in
the industry did not unite in support of these different rulemakings. For
example, while consumers and IPPs generally favored regulations
governing competitive bidding conditioned on open access and lightened

regulation of IPPs, the powerful traditional electric utility lobby ardently
opposed them." Piecemeal reform did not create consensus. Courts'
applications of the hard look doctrine posed uncertainty and a high risk
of reversal, and thus may have deterred FERC from pursuing its
fragmented rulemakings in the face of opposition. Frustrated with their

ability to seek comprehensive reform at FERC, consumers, IPPs, and
traditional electric utilities in the industry transcended their short-sighted
differences and sought relief from Congress. Congress provided relief in

the Energy Policy Act, which contained a "compromise""' broadening
198.
See supra note 90.
199.
See supra note 91.
200.
See, e.g., Divergent Opinions of Electric NOPRs on Full Display at the
Commission, INSIDE FERC, July 25, 1988, at 4 (noting that, although IPPs liked the
proposed rules, most electric utilities in the industry perceived them as conceptually,
theoretically, operationally, and empirically unsupported).
201.
See Energy Bill PassageLikely to Prompt a Big Package of Rulemakings at
the FERC, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Oct. 12, 1992, at 13 (noting that investor-owned
utilities, IPPs, and consumer groups were all reasonably happy with the Senate/House
compromise on the electricity title); see also H.R. REP No. 474(1), 102d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, at 140 (1992) (noting that PUHCA reform, which would benefit IPPs and utilities,
would be accompanied by "a variety of protections for consumers and other
competitors"). According to Representative Sharp, the Chairman of the Subcommittee
of Energy and Power of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce:
H.R. 776 will . . . introduce historic changes to the electricity
industry-increasing competition among suppliers and providing protections
for consumer pocketbooks. It is worth noting that this provision, which
amends two fundamental New Deal era reforms and had been expected to be
very controversial, was the subject of extraordinary cooperative negotiation
in the conference.
The final product, a true compromise, is a stronger statement than either
the House or Senate bill of the Congress' desire to see competition in the
generation of electricity and the availability of access to the Nation's
transmission grid for all comers without regard to monopoly or market power.
In this case, the Congress has sent a strong message to monopolists to learn
to compete and to seek power at prices that will benefit consumers-or get out
of the way.
138 CONO. REc. H 11,400 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992). Representative Dingell, the Chairman
of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce stated that the bill "carefully strikes
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FERC's ability to implement open access' and provided incentives to
further expand the role of NUGs in competitive bulk power markets,
including provisions which would allow electric utilities to benefit from
this growth.'
A related example involves competitive bidding. The presence of the
hard look doctrine may have deterred FERC from pursuing its
competitive bidding proposed rulemaking further. This may have
encouraged consumers and IPPs to lobby more vigorously for competitive
bidding at the state level, where utilities would be less likely, due to
higher political visibility, to oppose competitive pricing regimes. Thus,
the presence of vigorous judicial review could also partially explain the
increase in state competitive bidding programs from only a few in 1988
to more than thirty in 1993.1
. In addition to the effects of judicial review on the agency, courts
should be cognizant of positive and negative inter-institutional choice
effects. Pierce's account, like many other policy-effect studies of judicial
review, ignores altogether the effects of judicial review on governmental
institutions other than the agency reviewed. By looking to the interinstitutional effects of the hard look doctrine, I do not mean to suggest
that critical judicial review is the only reason the Energy Policy Act won
congressional support. Clearly, other factors, such as the Persian Gulf
War, worked to dramatically increase the urgency of energy issues at the
national level. Rather, I only wish to suggest that the hard look doctrine,
a balance between the concerns of many who are affected by its provisions, namely
consumers, ratepayers, municipals, industrials, utility companies, and State and Federal
regulators." 138 CONG. REc. H11,428 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992).
202.
The open access provisions were supported by IPPs, consumer groups, and
smaller "transmission-dependent" utilities, such as municipal utilities and rural electric
cooperatives. These interests generally took the position that PUHCA reform would be
meaningless absent open access. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 75, at 788 (statement
of Steven E. Collier on behalf of the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association).
203.
Unlike the previous competitive reforms introduced through rulemaking at the
FERC, the Energy Policy Act contained benefits for traditional electric utilities in the
industry. For example, the Act allows utilities to benefit from the growth of the IPP
industry by exempting them and their affiliates from certain lease and ownership roles in
PUHCA-exempt wholesale generators. In conference, the PUHCA reform sections of the
Act were supplemented with a controversial provision allowing domestic utilities to invest
in utility projects abroad with virtually no regulatory oversight. This provision met sharp
criticism on the floor, including a promise of "close and careful" oversight of oversea
investments by utilities. 138 CONO. REC. H 11,428 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement
of Rep. Dingell); id. at H 11,446 (statement of Rep. Markey). In addition, traditional
electric utilities in the industry may have benefited from more favorable transmission
policy, as suggested by floor statements rejecting the "Utah Hammer." See supra note
147 and accompanying text.
204.
See Order Terminating Proceedings, supra note 93.
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as applied by reviewing courts in a political conversation with other
governmental branches, may have had at least some impact on policy
choice and agenda setting outside of FERC. And it may well continue to
have inter-institutional effects in the future, for example, by encouraging
Congress or state legislatures or regulatory bodies to address retail
wheeling. Policy-effect critics of judicial review must be cognizant of
positive and negative impacts on inter-institutional choice in order to
assess the full costs and benefits of judicial review.
B. DeliberativeDemocracy and JudicialReview
Pierce's analysis also gives short shrift to some of the most
compelling reasons for judicial review in an industry restructuring
context. Modern "civic republican" theorists view the Constitution as an
attempt to ensure that governmental decisions result from a process which
allows participation and deliberation, respecting and reflecting the values
A civic republican political theory views
of all members of society.'
government's primary responsibility as enabling its citizens to participate
in a deliberative manner in the process which leads it to policy choices
and their modification.'
Borrowing from this civic republican
literature, deliberative democratic political theory envisions a role for the
judiciary in contributing to a process of legitimate government.
Competitive restructuring, like deregulation efforts in other
industries, is likely to produce both winners and losers in the electric
utility industry. It is not a Pareto improvement-even for consumers.
Where multiple interests are in conflict, the hard look doctrine compels:
agencies to affirm deliberative democratic values in the rulemaking
process. The hard look doctrine, by sustaining a political conversation
among governmental branches, contributes to legitimacy and thus is a
fully warranted exercise of judicial authority.

205.
See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND THE LAW 102-03
(1988); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1513-14 (1988); Mark
Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justificationfor the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1512, 1514 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J.
1539, 1548-49 (1988); Symposium, The Civic Republican Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493
(1988). For a critical, although somewhat uncharitable, response to the civic republican
legal literature, see Steven G. Gey, The UnfortunateRevival of Civic Republicanism, 141
U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1993); see also Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously:
Republican-OrientedLegal Theory and the Moral Foundationof DeliberativeDemocracy,
82 CAL. L. REv. 331 (1994) (criticizing civic republican theorists for misinterpreting
Aristotle's democratic ideals).

206.

Seidenfeld, supra note 205, at 1514.
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1. THE INADEQUACY OF CONGRESSIONAL AND EXECUTIVE CONTROL

Although Congress is presumptively the lawmaking institution under
Article I of the Constitution, in a modern social and economic democracy
Congress does not, and should not, have a monopoly over
lawmaking.'
One reason that delegation' 5 to administrative
agencies occurs is that it is desirable for Congress to "precommit" itself
to deliberative democratic values. In addition to their institutional
advantage in focusing on problems and developing expertise, in many
instances agencies have a comparative advantage in promoting
participation and deliberative government.
Professor Mark Seidenfeld makes two arguments for the comparative
advantage of agencies in promoting what he has called "civic republican"
values.m
As Seidenfeld notes, congressional "structure and
decisionmaking processes are not conducive to deliberation. "210
Committee decisionmaking, prevalent throughout Congress, reflects a

"myriad of political bargains and compromises." 211 Thus, even if these
processes could be described as "deliberative," the influence of private
interest groups taints the process. Except where Congress debates highly

publicized issues of broad public concern, the legislative process is
antagonistic towards deliberation. 12
Q. FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 118.
207.
208.
Suffice it to say that a complete discussion of the merits of delegation is
beyond the scope of my analysis.
For two spirited, but diametrically opposed,
discussions, see DAVm SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993) (arguing for a revival of the

nondelegation doctrine); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation:Why Administrators Should
Make PoliticalDecisions, I J.LAW, ECON. & ORO. 81, 99 (1985) ("Delegation to experts
becomes a form of consensus building that, far from taking decisions out of politics, seeks
to give political choice a form in which potential collective action can be discovered and
its benefits realized."). Pierce has argued that a fatal flaw in the nondelegation argument
is that the judiciary is "institutionally incapable of creating and applying a delegation
doctrine." Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and Delegated Power: A
Response to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 391, 393 (1987).
209.
Seidenfeld, supra note 205. Seidenfeld has since abandoned the "civic
republican" ideal for "deliberative democracy." See Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated
Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretationof
Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 1994).
210.
Seidenfeld, supra note 205, at 1544.
211.
Id. at 1545.
212.
Notably, Seidenfeld does not address the ability of Congress' internal
constraints to enhance deliberation. The types of constraints imposed by the committee
structure, the House Rules Committee, and Senate filibuster rules and unanimous consent
devices (which effectively require a super-majority), may work to enhance deliberation.
For an excellent discussion of these internal constraints, see CHARLES TIEFER,
CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1989).
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Second, Seidenfeld notes, congressional structure and decisionmaking
processes may pose problems for judicial review. If courts were to
inquire whether the legislative process passes deliberative democratic
muster, which itself could prove a Herculean task in legislative history
research, this would subject all congressional enactments to the threat of
an irreversible judicial veto." 3 If courts struck down legislation which
failed to pass deliberative democratic muster, Congress could reenact the
same statute, or a new one, after more deliberation. But if a court finds
recurring fault with Congress' deliberative processes, Congress could
effectively be prevented from passing the legislation.21'
Some have argued that, if we accept broad delegation of lawmaking
power to agencies, congressional oversight of agency decisionmaking is
a necessary check on this power.215 Congressional oversight may be
necessary, but it is hardly sufficient for the realization of deliberative
democratic values. Once Congress has chosen to delegate, congressional
regulation of executive appointments and removals or oversight alone will
not be sufficient to ensure that agency decisionmaking processes are
committed to deliberative democratic values. It is doubtful that Congress
could effectively review and control agency decisionmaking. It has been
recognized that "the outcome of a legislative attempt to rectify an act of
noncompliance by an agency will not, in general, reproduce the policy
outcome that was sought by the winning coalition, even if the preferences
of the members of the legislative body remain unchanged." 1 Further,
there is no reason to suspect that congressional regulation of agency
decisionmaking would avoid the same antagonism towards deliberation as
first-order congressional decisionmaking. Indeed, there is reason to
believe that congressional oversight, by further concentrating power,
would further thwart deliberation and participation. 7
Others, including Pierce,1 8 have argued that executive control of
213.
Seidenfeld, supra note 205, at 1546.
214.
Id.
215.
See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential
Lawmaking, 61 U. CHi. L. REV. 123 (1994); Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking
and PresidentialPower: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 619
(1989).
216.
Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:
AdministrativeArrangements and the PoliticalControl ofAgencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431,
433 (1989).
217.
Ackerman and Hassler, for example, argue that much of the delay and
incoherence in EPA's wet scrubber rule resulted from the political influence exerted by
two powerful senators.

BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN

COAL/DRTY Am 44-48 (1981).
218.
Pierce, Political Theory, supra note 13, at 471-72, 507-13; see also Peter L.
Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

agency discretion is sufficient to sustain democratic decisionmaking.
Pierce's earlier writings claim that executive control is the only oversight

option which is compatible with political and constitutional theory.219
His argument for executive control is based in large part on the agency
review program initiated by the Reagan administration and followed by
the Bush administration, which required agencies to conform their rules
to administration policy and to submit major regulations to the Office of
Management and Budget for cost-benefit review by the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs.'

The Clinton administration has

initiated a similar review program.Y 1 According to Pierce, the
executive branch is the superior body for overseeing agency
decisionmaking because "policy choices should be made by the most
politically accountable branch of govern-ment . . . ."
Courts

should have no role in oversight because, in Pierce's view, they are
antimajoritarian and hence undemocratic.'
But executive control alone is also insufficient for the realization of
deliberative democratic values. Imperfections associated with the "top
down" nature of executive control may do violence to deliberative
democratic ideals.
First, the ability of powerful special interests to
influence the executive may thwart deliberative decisionmaking.Y
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 599, 602, 615-16, 640-41, 648-49, 663 (1984).
219.
Pierce, Political Theory, supra note 13.
220.
Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128-32 (1982). In 1985, the White
House issued a second Executive Order requiring agencies to submit a regulatory plan
detailing their priorities for the next fiscal year and reporting regulatory actions taken.
Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985).
221.
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993).
222.
Pierce, Political Theory, supra note 13, at 506.
223.
Id. at 524-25 ("De novo judicial review would result in the substitution of
judicial policy making for agency policy making. This shift in power cannot be viewed
happily by those who favor policy making by political bodies sensitive to majoritarian
preferences."). For a similarly motivated critique of judicial review in the constitutional
law context, see ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962) (raising
counter-majoritarian difficulty with judicial review). Many constitutional law scholars
have since abandoned the attempt to solve Bickel's "difficulty" as a misguided diversion
in both historiography and political theory. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); Barry Friedman, Dialogue andJudicialReview, 91 MICH.
L. REV. 577 (1993).
224.
The recent interference of the White House Council on Competitiveness,
chaired by Vice President Dan Quayle, symbolizes the wrath of a "shadow government"
which undermined critical safety, health, and environmental regulations-often in secret,
non-deliberative ways which limited participation to large business interests.
See
generally Malcolm D. Woolf, Clean Air or Hot Air?: Lessons from the Quayle
Competitive Council's Oversight of the EPA, 10 J.L. & POL. 97 (1993); Quayle Council
Recommends Killing Recycling Provision in Incinerator Rule, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1595
(1990). It is ironic that Pierce relies on the Reagan administration's oversight efforts to
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Second, because the President has both a national and an international
agenda, he or she will frequently be removed from agency
decisionmaking. In most cases, unsupervised staff will be doing the
overseeing. This problem is especially pervasive with respect to
independent agencies, such as the FERC, which remain formally outside
of Presidential influence.'
Furthermore, it is much easier to control
agencies by stopping their regulatory activities altogether than by initiating
them. Thus, executive control will be more successful where agencies are
implementing deregulatory programs, rather than regulation.'
Even if executive oversight is coupled with congressional oversight,
this will not be without its problems. The executive branch may be
caught in a negative sum oversight game with Congress: as the White
House escalates its oversight efforts, Congress will respond in a futile
attempt to catch up, producing additional oversight by the White House
and resulting in increased secrecy and micro-management, not more
accountable government which relies on participation and deliberation
before the agency.'

bolster his majoritarian arguments: similar programs had been carried out by the Ford and
Carter administrations, but the Reagan oversight plan (as continued by the Bush
administration) was more secret and centralized in the White House, and did not provide
for public input or public reports from the Office of Management and Budget. See
RICHARD HARRIS & SIDNEY Mums, THE POLrIcs OF REGULATORY CHANGE: A TALE
OF TWO AOENCIES 104-05 (1989); see also Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3 C.F.R. 926

(1971-1975) (Ford order designed to force agencies to consider the inflationary impacts
of their regulations); Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979) (Carter order
requiring regulatory analysis of every "major" rule proposed).
225.
On independent agencies, see Susan Bartlett Foote, Independent Agencies
Under Attack: A Skeptical View of the Importance of the Debate, 1988 DuKE L.J. 223;
Glen 0. Robinson, Independent Agencies: Form and Substance in Executive Prerogative,
1988 DUKE L.J. 238; Aulana L. Peters, Independent Agencies. Government'sScourge or
Salvation?, 1988 DuKE. L.J. 286.
226.
For similarly spirited critiques of the executive control model, see Linda R.
Hirschman, Postmodern Jurisprudenceand the Problem of AdministrativeDiscretion, 82
Nw. U. L. REv. 646 (1988).
227.
This criticism is presented in more detail by Sidney A. Shapiro, Political
Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46 ADMIN. L. REv. 1 (1994)
(arguing that increased political oversight over the last 12 years has reduced the discretion
of administrative agencies without more democracy or better regulatory policy). Shapiro
notes that, although the end of divided government will moderate this game, it is unlikely
to end it. Id. at 40. His solution is balance and creative dialogue.
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2. COMPETITIVE RESTRUCTURING IS NOT A PARETO
IMPROVEMENT-EVEN FOR CONSUMERS

Competitive restructuring of the electric utility industry, most would
argue, will increase net consumer surplus.'
Pierce seems to assume
that, because consumers as a group will be better off under competitive
restructuring of the electric industry, all consumers will favor the same
reforms.'
A Pareto improvement is a policy change after which all
affected persons are better off.'
However, competitive restructuring
of the industry is not a Pareto improvement, even for consumers.
Pierce sets up "powerful constituencies" 3 1-presumably
the

entrenched traditional utility industry-as a formidable enemy to
competitive restructuring. Others in the industry, however, are also likely
to oppose certain aspects of competitive restructuring. Consumer groups
in the industry, for example, are far from united on issues of competitive
restructuring. While many large-load industrial customers stand to gain
both in the short- and long-term from competitive restructuring through
lower rates and increased purchasing flexibility; many wholesale
customers, such as local municipal utilities, rural electrical cooperatives,
and residential and small business consumers, can probably expect to pay
higher rates, at least in the short-term. 2 Large transition costs will
228.
The experience of other countries with deregulating the electricity industry
supports the thesis that competition will increase net consumer surplus. For example,
significant savings have been realized by consumers as a group in Norway, which has
implemented spot markets and traders on a common carrier grid. See Deregulation in
Norway Reduces PowerRates 50% After 2.5 Years, INDEPENDENT POWER REP., June 18,
1993, at 14. One author estimates that transmission to a competitive sector utility market
in the U.S. would save consumers $30 billion per year. Charles M. Studness, Estimating
the FinancialCost of Utility Regulation, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Nov. 1, 1993, at 48.
229.
He states with respect to natural gas restructuring: "Consumers and other
market participants suffered scores of billions of dollars of costs under that [traditional,
cost-plus] policy .... The new policy-creation of conditions conducive to a competitive
market and to market-based pricing-offers the prospect of saving society scores of
billions of dollars in the future." Pierce, Electricity Crisis, supra note 6, at 21.
230.
A move from one distribution of resources to another is Pareto superior if it
makes at least one person better off without making any other person worse off. See Jules
Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 221, 226-31 (1980),
reprinted in JULES COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS & THE LAW 67, 71-76 (1988); Jules
Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 512-26
(1980), reprinted in JULE COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS & THE LAw 95, 97-105
(1988).
231.
Pierce, Electricity Crisis, supra note 6, at 10-11.
232.
There are several reasons why many smaller customers will pay higher rates
under competitive regimes in the short-run. Here are a few of the more obvious: (1)
Under traditional cost-of-service regulation, capacity allocated to the high-load industrial
customer is included in rate base. Most high-load industrial customers prefer to take their
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likely be borne by smaller customers.'
In addition, smaller customers
may suffer long-term increases in cost.'
In recent remarks, Pierce
himself acknowledged the significance of these transitional costs, which
some in the industry estimate as falling within the $200 to $300 billion
range. 2 5
However, according to Pierce, reviewing judges should ignore
transition costs and defer to FERC's assessment of net benefits:
Once an agency makes a change in policy, the costs of the
transition to that policy are pure sunk costs. They cannot be
eliminated, retrieved, or even reduced.
power on an interruptible basis if they are given a sufficient discount. In a competitive
pricing regime, interruptible service would be priced at variable cost and would not be
allocated any fixed capacity costs, such as a generation plant. (This is because
interruptible service, if properly implemented, would not constrain plant capacity.) By
contrast, under traditional cost-of-service regulation, utilities had little incentive to price
interruptible power at marginal cost. In many areas in which cost-of-service regulation
remains, industrials who take power on an interruptible basis are paying a large portion
of fixed costs, and thus are subsidizing smaller consumers. See Agis Salfukas, How a
StaidElectric Company Becomes aRenegade, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 12, 1993, at 1OF ("Rates
paid by large industrial customers have often enabled utilities to keep prices down for
their residential customers."). If market-based pricing were fully implemented, smaller
consumers could expect to lose this subsidy.
(2) Utilities have built the capacity to serve specific industrial loads under traditional
franchise-area regulation. However, as more NUGs arise in bulk power markets and as
large-load customers make decisions to purchase their power from outside of the
traditional franchise system, many small customers will be left paying the cost of
"stranded investment" in utility plants. See id. ("If local utilities begin to lose big
customers to far away competitors, rates would probably rise for the residential and small
commercial customers whose business might seem too small to interest the interlopers.").
(3) Many industrials own QFs or are affiliated with NUGs, and thus stand to gain from
long-term purchase agreements with utilities. However, smaller customers may bear the
risk of such arrangements, especially if they turn out to be sham, or inadequately
financed, arrangements. See, e.g., AY P.S.C. Okays $122-Million Con Ed Payment to
Buy Out Five NUG Pacts, ELECrRIC UTIL. WK., Nov. 8, 1993, at 18.
233.
Pierce acknowledges: "Any [transition cost] allocation method FERC devises
will be vulnerable to plausible allegations of inequity with respect to one or more groups
of market participants." Pierce, Electricity Crisis, supra note 6, at 10.
234.
Smaller customers might be worse off in the long run because: (1) the
increased risk associated with greater competition will lead to higher financing costs for
utilities and, in turn, higher rates; and (2) as more generators tap into power grids,
systems will become unreliable, leading to blackouts or "cratered" systems, abandoned
if NUGs decide suddenly to shut down or go off-line. This second consideration is
especially risky when NUGs have arisen from creative financing arrangements. See
generally F. WILLIAM PAYNE, CREATIVE FINANCING FOR ENERGY CONSERVATION AND
COGENERATION (1984).

235.

Wamsted, supra note 86.
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' * ' It would be irrational to jeopardize attainment of
scores of billions of dollars in social welfare gains because of
a perceived flaw in an agency's treatment of a relatively trivial
distributional issue.'
Pierce is correct to note that, once a decisionmaking body has committed
itself to a policy change, distributional effects are a sunk cost. Economic
theory would suggest that once we have committed ourselves to a policy
choice, we should evaluate social costs ex ante at the margin.
However, this is an issue separate from the appropriateness of an
agency's exercise of discretion in allocating these costs between
consumers and regulated entities, some of which stand to gain while
others are likely to lose. Judicial review should not defer to any change
in social policy merely because it increases net social benefits. Rather,
judicial review should concern itself with ensuring the reasonableness of
the agency's exercise of its discretion in deciding how, if at all, to make
such changes. The hard look doctrine is not concerned merely with the
ex ante effects of FERC's decisionmaking at the margin. Rather, at its
core, the hard look doctrine is concerned with the reasons the agency has
proffered for exercising its discretion as it did. When courts invoke the
hard look doctrine, they expose the agency's discretion to scrutiny by
evaluating the presence of participation and deliberation of the agency.
3. THE HARD LOOK DOCTRINE AND AFFIRMATION OF DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRATIC VALUES

The first strand of the deliberative democratic model is increased
citizen participation. Participatory values have their source in procedural
fairness. Fair procedures allow all participants to have their views
considered by the agency. Agencies will be more likely to consider all
views if they anticipate judicial scrutiny of their decisionmaking
processes. Thus, court application of the hard look doctrine ensures
participation by precluding agencies from giving one interest the rubberstamp in the rulemaking process, only to ignore the objections of other
interests. Fair procedures will contribute to the legitimacy of government
regardless of the substantive outcomes they generate in the form of a final
rule. Persons and entities subject to bureaucratic regulation are more
236.

Pierce, Electricity Crisis, supra note 6, at 21-22.
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likely to view agency decisions as legitimate if the procedures leading to
their formulation are fair. 2"
Participatory values are fundamental to the legitimacy of industry
restructuring rulemakings, such as FERC's recent efforts to restructure
competitively the energy industry. In the context of electric utility
industry restructuring, application of the hard look doctrine by the courts
creates incentives for the agency to consider all voices, however faint, in
reforming regulatory policy. Small customers who will bear many of the
short-term transition costs of deregulation in the electric utility industry
are likely to raise objections to competitive reform absent equitable
allocation of transition costs. Application of the hard look doctrine by
reviewing courts ensures that their objections will be heard and adequately
considered." 8
The second strand of the deliberative democratic model, reasoned
decisionmaking through a process of deliberation, is also protected by
judicial review. Through its requirement of "reasoned decisionmaking,"
the hard look doctrine encourages agencies to engage in deliberation. In
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC,

"

Judge Leventhal of the

D.C. Circuit noted:
[A] n agency changing its course must supply a reasoned analysis
indicating that prior policies and standards are being deliberately
changed, not casually ignored, and if an agency glosses over or
swerves from prior precedents without discussion it may cross
the line from the tolerably terse to the intolerably mute.'
In applying the doctrine, courts examine whether the agency has
considered not only the views of participating parties but other relevant
reasons as well."
Thus, the hard look doctrine imposes a
237.
Research in social psychology suggests this to be so. See JOHN THIBAUT &
LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 121 (1975)
(greater consideration of individualized arguments enhances perceptions of procedural
fairness); E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE (1988).

238.
A landmark case for the participatory strand of the deliberative democratic
model is Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) (noting that the public interest includes consideration
of aesthetic, conversational, and recreation needs, and that the FPC alone could not
protect this interest); see also Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ
v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
239.
444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
240.
Id. at 852.
241.
Under the "arbitrary and capricious" test, the court is to "consider whether
the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has
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decisionmaking expectation which is stronger than the affirmation of
participatory values.
Deliberative government is characterized by the requirement of
reasoned analysis, or rationality, in the hard look doctrine. The thrust of
a requirement of rationality is this: changes in regulatory law are
permitted, but only as a product of reasoned analysis brought to bear on
accumulated experience; not just the result of transitory political forces or
regulatory appointees. 2 To the extent that the hard look doctrine
guards against the exercise of such naked preferences in the political
process by requiring consideration of all of the relevant reasons as well
as deliberation about the public good, it has a legitimacy-enhancing role
and is a fully justified use of judicial authority.'

Rationality also has the indirect effect of ensuring comprehension.
Many critics of judicial review argue that courts are likely to
misunderstand the technical reasons behind an agency's policy choice, and
thus have no business interfering with implementation of the agency's
expertise.'
While Max Weber's notion that government's claim to
legitimacy derives from its ability to wield power on the basis of
knowledge has a certain appeal in a world awash in social complexity and
scientific uncertainty,' it should not be implemented in isolation of the
democratic process.'
Major changes in policy should be articulable

in common language, easily comprehended by reviewing courts and the
been a clear error of judgment." Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys.,
Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974) (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 416 (1971)).
242.
Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress,
Deregulatory Change, & the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
1101, 1131-41 (1988).
243.
See SUNSTEN, supra note 119, at 57-58.
244.
Strands of this assertion emerge from Pierce's analysis, which suggests that
reviewing courts may not have understood the reasons behind FERC's policy choices.
Pierce, Electricity Crisis, supra note 6, at 20, 23.
245.
MAx WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 973-80 (Guenther Roth & Claus
Wittich eds., 1978).
246.
Most regulation involves not pure questions of scientific expertise, but value
judgments, such as who should bear certain risks or the costs of a policy choice. With
respect to such questions, technical analysis is often inconclusive. CHARLES E. LINDBLOM
& DAVID K. COHEN, USABLE KNOWLEDoE: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOCIAL PROBLEM
SOLVING 47, 81 (1979). Moreover, such data is manipulable by experts within the agency
hoping to persuade the policymakers in the agency's attempts to appease its overseers.
ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 217, at. 80-84. Value judgments are, in many
respects, inevitable.

ECONOMICS (1994).

See DONALD MCCLOSKEY, KNOWLEDGE AND PERSUASION IN
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regulated industry, and the beneficiaries of a regulatory scheme.'
Otherwise, we run the risk of divorcing the exercise of bureaucratic
expertise from the democratic process. If agencies anticipate that the
reasoned basis for their rules and policies will be subject to the scrutiny
of reviewing courts, agencies will be more likely to formulate reasons in
understandable language relating to the policies advanced. Only if the
bases for policy changes are articulated in understandable terms will
courts be able to review them for rationality, or Congress be able to
review them for responsiveness to the will of the people., Thus, by
invoking the hard look doctrine to review the sufficiency of an agency's
reasoned analysis, courts play a role in ensuring that the dialogue of
bureaucratic expertise is compatible with the democratic process.
As a general matter, the role of courts in reviewing agency
procedures is widely accepted. When courts review the substantive
rationality of an agency's policy choice, however, they are often criticized
for imposing their own arbitrary political preferences. Inevitably,
however, consideration of a "reasoned analysis" implies a substantive as
well as a procedural component to the hard look doctrine.'
When
courts invoke the hard look doctrine, they force agencies to adopt a
decisional process designed to ensure that the relevant reasons for
change-namely, those public values enshrined in the Rule of Law
through a democratic process-are identified and implemented, or force
agencies to articulate alternative reasons. Judicial review becomes more
substantive when a court becomes more demanding in assessing the
relationship of an agency's reasoning to the Rule of Law, congressional
purposes, and the agency's own stated purposes. 9 The judiciary has
247.
This focus on conversational legitimacy is consistent with the writings of
many contemporary political theorists. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE
IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE

MORALITY 113-43 (Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978). Its most compelling theorist has been
J~rgen Habermas, who views truth as intersubjectively determined consensual norms
derived through participatory politics. JURGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (1975);
JORCEN HABERMAS, TOWARD A RATIONAL SOCIETY (1970); JOrgen Habermas, Law and

Morality, in THE TANNER LECTURES IN HUMAN VALUES 219 (S.M. McMurrin ed.,
1988). Parallels between dialogic accounts of legitimacy and civic republican theory have
been observed in Friedman, supra note 223; Steven M. Feldman, Republican
Revival/Interpretive Turn, 1991 WiS. L. REV. 679.
248.
Cf.THOMAS 0. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF
REGULATORY•ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1991).

249.
Id. at 295. In deregulatory contexts, some reviewing courts have demanded
that an agency explain the connection between the policy they seek to reverse and the
congressional intent they seek to further. See generally International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 735 F.2d 1525, 1531-32 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (requiring agency to supply
reasoned analysis relating to law enforcement function for change in reporting requirement
that had been in effect for over 30 years); Action on Smoking and Health v. CAB, 699
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a role in facilitating agency dialogue on these issues. It is appropriate for
courts, through application of the hard look doctrine, to encourage
affirmation of the deliberative values in the Rule of Law as a check on the
decisionmaking discretion of agencies, as traditional separation of powers
doctrine would suggest. This is not to say that judges can impose their
own arbitrary political choices on an agency; judges must invoke
understandable legal reasons for overruling an agency's decision.'
In the electricity restructuring context, reviewing the application of
the hard look doctrine ensures that the democratic values enshrined in the
FPA-particularly values relating to distributional equities'-will be
properly identified and implemented. At a minimum, the presence of
substantive judicial review will compel an agency to compare different
reasons for the way in which it has chosen to exercise its discretion. The
ability of courts to add to the dialogue concerning the meaning of the
FPA in an open manner contributes to democratic legitimacy.
4. JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE HARD LOOK DOCTRINE
The hard look doctrine is a legitimate and fully warranted exercise
of judicial authority. However, Pierce suggests that courts have applied
the doctrine as "a pretext for rejecting any policy decision that displeases
the reviewing judges " 2 in cases like AGA. 3 He concludes that, in
the face of reviewing courts' application of the hard look doctrine,
'
"FERC cannot know what would constitute 'adequate consideration.'" 5
Because of the manner in which the hard look doctrine has been applied,
Pierce argues, agencies are unable to predict what reasons will pass
F.2d 1209, 1216-17 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (requiring agency to engage in "reasoned
consideration of competing objectives and alternatives" prior to rescinding smoking
regulations); Wheaton Van Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 671 F.2d 520, 527-28 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(requiring agency to engage in reasoned decisionmaking process "based on supportable
facts 'and conclusions" which "promote equal application of the law" in departing from
its past policies regarding purchases of operating rights from dormant carriers).
250.
The significance of legal reasons is discussed further infra part IV.B.4.
251.
See, e.g., FPA §§ 205, 206, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e (Supp. IV 1992)
(prohibiting rates and charges which are not "just and reasonable," which grant an undue
preference or advantage, or which discriminate on the basis of class of service or
locality). Traditional application of §§ 205 and 206 by courts and FERC has included
consideration of the inter-customer equities.
252.
Pierce, Electricity Crisis, supra note 6, at 28.
253.
See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
254.
Id. at 23.
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judicial muster and, in some instances, must attempt to reconcile
seemingly contradictory messages from reviewing courts. 5
The fact that application of the hard look doctrine is indeterminate,
however, should not be a reason for rejecting its use in judicial review.
It is perhaps too easy to conclude that, because reviewing courts exercise
unconstrained discretion with this doctrine, it invites an unwarranted
exercise of judicial authority. Discretion, whether exercised by the
agency or courts, is likely to be considered troublesome because two or
more outcomes are possible. Members of the legal community will often
disagree about an outcome, but this is no reason for judges to defer to
legislative or agency choices.'
To the contrary, as Professor Daniel
Farber has recently argued, the indeterminacy introduced by judicial
review may produce "hysteresis effects," allowing courts, agencies and
regulated players to learn more about the consequences of a regulatory
decision. By contrast, if courts were to take an irreversible step, such as
deferring to FERC's findings regarding the impact of "stranded"
generation costs on certain customers and allowing transmission access
under these terms, this would foreclose further study, debate and
acquisition of knowledge on this issue. Judicial review introduces
uncertainty and requires the agency and regulated industry to wait for
regulatory changes.
As Farber notes, "[W]aiting is equivalent to
purchasing an option contract, and under many circumstances that option
has positive value."-"
Thus, the yearning for determinacy in judicial review is misplaced.
Judges will always have discretion of some sort, even in what may appear
to be the simplest cases. Notwithstanding this discretion, judges have a
duty to uphold the law."~ Judges give reasons for deciding a case in
a certain manner. Reasons relating to the relevant set of legal materials,
as accepted by the legal community, are legal reasons. Legal reasons
255.
"Because agencies must regularly address 'questions plagued by multiple
uncertainties and a scarcity of information . . . [a] bright lawyer. . . can make almost
any regulatory analysis document appear to be irrational." Id. at 26 (citing McGarity,
supra note 55, at 1329).
256.
See DWORKIN, supra note 117, at 112-13.
257.
Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Protection as a Learning Experience, 27
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 791, 803 (1994). Farber suggests lowering the scope of review under
the hard look doctrine where the agency can demonstrate that: (1) the regulatory action
at issue will not cause irreparable injury; (2) the agency has taken steps to discover and
generate additional relevant information; and (3) the agency has in place a process that
will result in reappraisal of the regulatory action as new information is evaluated. Id. at
806. His analysis of "hysteresis" is based on Avinash Dixit, Investment and Hysteresis,
6 J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1992, at 107.
258.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(2) (1990) (a judge "should
be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it").
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include, in addition to the traditional core of legal materials, such as case
law and statutes, the background procedural norms and justifications from
which the core emanates. Legal reasons can be contrasted with moral and
other kinds of reasons which do not in any way depend upon the law,
such as a judge's personal political, moral, or policy preferences. Judges
exercise their discretion in good faith when they decide cases on the basis
of legal reasons-the relevant core of legal materials-and not on the basis
of their personal political, moral, or policy preferences.'
It is constructive to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate
exercises of judicial discretion in applying the hard look doctrine.
Consider, for example, Pierce's critique of the District of Columbia
Circuit's application of the adequate consideration doctrine in AGA.'
Judges appropriately apply the adequate consideration doctrine when they
examine the reasons the agency would have adopted had it made an
alternative policy choice, and when they determine whether the agency,
prior to adoption of a final rule, compared those reasons to the reasons
that form the basis for the agency's final policy choice."' When
applying the adequate consideration doctrine, a court should accept an
agency's decision so long as the agency, prior to its adoption of a final
policy choice, adequately considered the alternative reasons. A court
should not impose a policy choice on an agency. Instead, it should
remand to the agency for reconsideration in light of its past mistakes.
Thus, in AGA, to the extent the reviewing court rejected FERC's
final rule for failure to examine reasons FERC had (prior to adoption of
its policy choice) already considered by comparing them to the reasons
259.
Professor Steven Burton, in presenting his good faith theory of adjudication,
acknowledges that the law is indeterminate. Burton acknowledges, however, that
indeterminacy does not matter within the practice of adjudication, internally understood.
Unlike Dworkin, Posner, and others who have attempted to "solve" law's indeterminacy,
Burton, like most judges and lawyers, is content to live with it. See STEVEN J. BURTON,
JUDOINO IN GOOD FArrH (1992). As most constitutional scholars have moved beyond the
attempts of Bickel and others to solve the perceived counter-majoritarian difficulty, see
supra note 223, Burton suggests that legal theorists move beyond their misguided attempts
to "solve" the perceived problem of indeterminacy. The indeterminacy of a policy
choice's consistency with the legal landscape may well be accepted within the practice of
internal agency decisionmaking. While many critics ofjudicial review propose deference
to agency decisionmaking as a solution to the problem of indeterminacy, perhaps agency
decisionmakers have resolved themselves to living with it.
See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
260.
It is crucial, in applying the hard look doctrine, that courts determine whether
261.
the agency considered the alternatives prior to the adoption of its final policy choice. Cf.
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943) (the record cannot include materials
produced post hoc, as the agency's attorneys try to justify a decision to the reviewing
court). Condoning post hoc rationales would work to thwart affirmation of participatory
values.
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for its final policy choice in Order No. 500, the court may have
inappropriately imposed its own policy choice on the agency. By
contrast, if the reviewing court in AGA had determined that FERC failed
to compare the rejected reasons with the reasons behind its final policy
choice, that FERC's reasons were contradicted by other legal reasons
(e.g., Congress' intent) or that FERC failed to make this comparison
prior to the issuance of a final agency rule, the decision would have been
an appropriate, and fully warranted, application of the doctrine.
As described by Pierce, AGA appears to be an imprudent intrusion
on FERC's discretion and an overly activist application of the hard look
doctrine. The AGA court, in rejecting FERC's policy choice in Order
No. 500, did not examine the nature and sufficiency of the reasons behind
alternative choices, but instead focused on the policy choices themselves.
Application of the hard look doctrine should be concerned with the
adequacy of the agency's reasons, not their results. To the extent the
District of Columbia Circuit in AGA rejected FERC's decision because of
its failure to adopt a policy choice deemed by the court, for non-legal
reasons, to be preferable, it is not exemplary appellate judging.
However, the court could have invoked alternative grounds for rejecting
FERC's decision without doing violence to the hard look doctrine if, for
example, it had rejected FERC's policy choices as inconsistent with
substantive statutory law or deliberative processes-legal reasons behind
the policy choice.
By contrast, in KN Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 2 the District of
Columbia Circuit reached an appropriate balance between its review of
the agency's rationale and its deference to the agency's deliberative
processes. At issue in KNEnergy was FERC's implementation of policies
regarding the allocation of take-or-pay costs established in Order No. 500.
FERC had rejected the pipeline's proposal to implement a take-or-pay
cost recovery mechanism by imposing a surcharge only upon sales
customers, and instead required the pipeline to impose the surcharge upon
all of its customers. KN Energy, a section 7(c) transportation customer
of the pipeline, appealed, arguing that FERC's decision violated the "cost
causation" principle, which traditionally required approved rates to reflect
to some degree the costs actually caused by the customers who must pay
them.
The District of Columbia Circuit, noting that FERC's interpretation
of its own regulations is entitled to more deference than its reading of a
statutory mandate, agreed with FERC's reading of Order No. 500.'
The court also held that FERC's decision was not inconsistent with
262.
263.

KN Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 968 F.2d 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1300.
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statutory or procedural authority, noting that Order No. 500 "may
represent only a minor departure from the cost-causation principle."2"
The court, however, found FERC's decision lacking in one crucial
respect. Specifically, FERC had failed to demonstrate a meaningful
connection between the rationale behind Order No. 500 and the particular
circumstances of Section 7(c) transportation customers. After noting that
charging Section 7(c) transportation customers some portion of take-orpay costs is "not inherently inconsistent with the requirement of reasoned
decisionmaking," the court vacated the Commission's decision and
remanded it to FERC for further consideration.'
The anomaly of AGA should not lead us to reject or restrict
application of the hard look doctrine in the energy restructuring context.
Rather, as I have argued, proper application of the hard look doctrine by
lower courts reviewing FERC restructuring rulemakings is a fully
warranted and legitimate exercise of judicial authority. Judges, unlike
agencies which react to immediate issues, possess the unique capacity to
fit to a problem the context of history and the full legal topography.'
The hard look doctrine, properly applied, contributes to the political
conversation between governmental branches, enhances deliberative
democratic decisionmaking and contributes to legitimacy.

V.

REFORMS TO RULEMAKING AND ADJUDICATION

According to the weak version of the policy-effect thesis, 7
supported by the descriptive analysis of FERC's policy choices in this
Article," judicial review has caused FERC to exhaust at least some of
Id. at 1302. It is not clear from the court's decision, however, whether the
264.
court or the agency provided this rationale post hoe, or whether it was provided by FERC
prior to its approval of a final rule.
Id. at 1304; see also Cajun Elec. Power Coop. Inc., 28 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir.
265.
1994) (per curiam) (reversing and remanding market-based tariff decision for failure to
conduct an evidentiary hearing addressing the impact of "open-access" transmission tariff
on utility's market power and for failure of FERC to adequately explain approval of
standard investment provision). Compare PUC of California v. FERC, 988 F.2d 154,
167 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (upholding the sufficiency of FERC's reasoning in a decision which
allowed a pipeline to abandon a gas-inventory charge and recover take-or-pay charges
from customers through an alternative method).
Cf.GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 44-58
266.
(1982). Judge Calabresi suggests that common law courts reviewing legislative or agency
rules "not be bound to declare or promulgate the new in order to find that the old fails
to fit." Id. at 165. This suggestion coheres with the hard look doctrine which, if
properly applied, would remand a decision to the agency for further deliberative
democratic reconsideration.
Described supra part I.
267.
See supra part III.
268.
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its policymaking resources in the adjudicative context, rather than through
rulemaking. This is consistent with the general conclusions drawn by
policy-effect critics who have examined other agencies, such as EPA,
OSHA, NHTSA, and FTC.' After examining the viability of changes
in external incentives designed to compel rulemaking, this Part advocates
some reforms to existing statutory mechanisms and judicial doctrine to
increase the accountability and deliberation of adjudicative decisionmaking

at FERC.
A. Why Not Presumptive Rulemaking?
Pierce, joined by policy-effect critics in other agency contexts,
suggests that it is preferable that policy be implemented through
rulemaking rather than ad hoc adjudication.'
Pierce identifies the
cause of the problem of FERC's choice of adjudication over rulemaking
as judicial review, particularly an instantiation known as the hard look
doctrine. There may well be some truth to the claim that, as a normative
matter, the use of rulemaking vis-a-vis ad hoc adjudication by FERC
would have been preferable:2 7' rulemaking increases participatory
fairness, has broader legitimacy, and is a more efficient mechanism for
making law and policy than ad hoc adjudication. 2 However, if we
accept the legitimacy of the hard look doctrine when appropriately applied
by the good faith exercise of judicial discretion, 3 we might be led to
solve the problem without constricting judicial review as Pierce and other
policy-effect authors suggest.
Agencies face a variety of incentives for choosing to make law and
policy by method of adjudication over rulemaking. Clearly, expectations
created by judicial review of agency discretion are one of these
incentives, but there are others as well. Agencies are likely to respond
to additional external incentives, such as executive oversight,27
269.
These studies are described supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
270.
Pierce, Electricity Crisis, supra note 6, at 11-13; MASHAW & HARFST,
STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY, supra note 3, at 5-6, 11-13; MELNICK, supra note 1, at
247.
271.
We should be careful to distinguish between those situations in which FERC
is issuing a de facto rule (a statement of general applicability and future effect) through
the use of adjudicative procedures, as opposed to those situations in which FERC is
legitimately using its adjudicative functions to make law on a case-by-case basis. The
FERC adjudicative proceedings discussed supra part III are of the latter, not the former,
type.
272.
See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
273.
See supra part IV.
274.
Notably, although the Office of Management and Budget's cost/benefit
review, discussed supra notes 220-21, imposes strict requirements on rulemaking that do
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congressional oversight, congressionally-imposed statutory requirements
and judicially imposed default mechanisms. Changing these other
external incentives may have as much, if not more, effect on agency
choice of lawmaking methodology as would curtailing judicial review.
While recognizing that changes to incentives provided by the executive
may also be in order,'" this Section examines potential changes to
congressionally or judicially imposed incentives for using rulemaking.
Congress has historically exercised control over delegated authority
through its oversight function. Strong congressional oversight of FERC's
choice of lawmaking methodology is clearly in order. In a March 1993
hearing addressing implementation of the Energy Policy Act,
Representative Philip Sharp, who chairs the Subcommittee of Energy and
Power of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, stated that
Congress is ready and willing to provide FERC assistance in resisting
opponents to electric industry restructuring through "oversight and any
other means we can identify to ensure that consumers benefit from a more
competitive wholesale market."276 Commendably, the Environment,
Energy, and Natural Resources Subcommittee of the House Operations
Committee, which oversees the operation of FERC's electricity regulation
program, has solicited and considered witnesses' comments concerning
the appropriateness of rulemaking versus adjudication at FERC. 2"
These committees should continue to exercise their oversight functions
with regard to FERC's choice of lawmaking methodology aggressively
and with rigor.
However, it is doubtful that congressional oversight alone would be
sufficient to induce FERC to exercise a general preference for rulemaking
not apply to adjudication, Pierce does not attribute adverse effects on agency decisions to
them.. Rather, he operates under the assumption that these executive oversight
mechanisms are normatively superior to other types of review. Pierce, Political Theory,
supra note 13, at 520-24.
275.
Margaret Gilhooley, Executive Oversight of Administrative Rulemaking:
Disclosing the Impact, 25 IND. L. REv. 299 (1991); Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning
AdministrativeAgencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 943
(1980).
276.
Energy Policy Act Implementation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy
and Power of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 1st Seas. 2
(1993) (statement of Philip R. Sharp, Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Power).
277.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Electricity Regulation Program:
HearingBefore the Environment, Energy, and NaturalResources Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Representative Synar,
Chairman of this Subcommittee, solicited witnesses' comments regarding the use of
adjudicative determinations for addressing classes of cases as opposed to generic
rulemaking, and the impact of case-by-case decisionmaking on the due process rights of
those who did not participate as parties in the original proceeding but who might be bound
by the precedents it established. Id.
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where it is making policy of precedential effect. Congress does not have
the resources to monitor every agency choice to make policy via
adjudication. Further, Congress may face strong political incentives to
leave this choice to the agency, as the same special interests which have
secured broad congressional delegation may also be able to keep Congress
from controlling the agency's procedural choices. Due to budgetary
limitations, agencies will always face conflicting congressional signals.
More importantly, the stronger Congress' oversight, the more agencies
may attempt to protect themselves from congressional review by shifting
For such reasons, it is
policymaking into an adjudicative context.'
well-recognized that, once decisionmaking discretion has been delegated
to an agency, it is very difficult for politicians to punish or correct
deviations from intended policies.'
A more effective mechanism for controlling agency choice of
lawmaking methodology ex ante is necessary. Remarkably, federal courts
have followed Chenery's deference to an agency's choice of lawmaking
At present,
methodology for over forty years with little criticism.'
federal law does not create any general preference for rulemaking.
Perhaps, in light of the policy-effect critiques of judicial review's adverse
effects on rulemaking, the time is ripe to reconsider this decision.
One reform option would be for Congress to amend the APA to
provide a default standard of statutory interpretation which obligates
agencies to make law through rulemaking rather than adjudication where
Congress has delegated discretion to an agency under a vague statutory
Alternatively,
standard, unless Congress has specified otherwise.
Congress might consider amending existing substantive laws such as the
FPA, which contain vague standards, in order to create a general
obligation for agencies to engage in rulemaking. Where Congress has
directed FERC to promulgate rulemakings, as it did in the Energy Policy
Act, FERC has responded positively and without hesitation." 1
But Congress might not have the political courage to implement such
requirements, especially given the political incentives it faces from
powerful interest groups to delegate hard policy and legal choices to
agencies. Even if Congress is able to enact a preference for rulemaking
and to decide on rulemaking deadlines, Congress' deadlines may never be
met due to conflicts with the agency and executive branch or budgetary
Absent effective congressional action, it might be
limitations.'
278.
279.
280.
281.

See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952, 963-65 (5th Cir. 1966).
McCubbins et al., supra note 216, at 443.
See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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considered a fully warranted and legitimate exercise of judicial authority
for federal courts to develop a similar default standard of statutory
interpretation for federal agencies. As Professor Kenneth Cuip Davis has
recognized, reviewing courts at the federal level have inherent authority
to create common law requiring agencies to adopt rules to guide the
exercise of their administrative discretion.'
Adoption of such a norm
in case law would enhance legitimacy by allowing judicial review,
particularly of the critical nature encouraged by the hard look doctrine,
to complement a system of agency lawmaking which is more accountable
to the will of the community at large.
At the state level, there is a growing movement to impose a legally
binding preference for rulemaking as the primary means of agency
lawmaking.'
In Megdal v. Oregon Board of Dental Examiners, for
example, the Oregon Supreme Court imposed a fairly broad obligation to
prefer rulemaking over adjudication for agency lawmaking on the State
Board of Medical Examiners.'
After rejecting the argument that the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required elaboration of
an "unprofessional conduct" standard by rule prior to its application in a
particular case,' the Oregon court based a general obligation for
agency rulemaking on the following principle of statutory construction:
[W]hen a licensing statute contains both a broad standard of
'unprofessional conduct' that is not fully defined in the statute
itself and also authority to make rules for the conduct of the
regulated occupation, the legislative purpose is to provide for
BUT NEED IMPROVEMENT, at ii (1985) (by mid-1985, only 14 percent of EPA's statutory
deadlines had been met); see also Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1474 (1986) (noting that EPA has frequently violated statutory
deadlines for the implementation of federal hazardous waste litigation).
283.
2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.26, at 128 (2d
ed. 1979). Davis presents four theoretical bases for his claim: (1) the nondelegation
doctrine has failed in recent years; (2) in some circumstances, lack of rules or standards
would be so unreasonable as to deny due process; (3) it is a way around the harsh
consequences of the void for vagueness doctrines; and (4) its an evolving common-law or
equitable consideration based on a judicial understanding of fairness and propriety. Id.
at 131.
284.
See Arthur E. Bonfield, State Administrative Policy Formulation and the
Choice ofLawmaking Methodology, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 121 (1990) [hereinafter Bonfield,
Lawmaking Methodology]; see also Arthur E. Bonfield, Mandating State Agency
Lawmaking by Rule, 2 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 161 (1988).
285.
605 P.2d 273 (Or. 1980) (en banc) (requiring Board to give content to
'unprofessional conduct" standard by rule prior to application in specific case).
286.
Id. at 274-78.
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the further specification of the standard by rules, unless a
different understanding is shown. 7
The Oregon Supreme Court excepted from this general obligation,
however, rulemaking which is "unfeasible" or impractical." Professor
Arthur Bonfield, a well-known advocate of the study of state
administrative law,'
has summarized Megdal's holding in the
following principle of statutory interpretation:
In the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, the legislature
is presumed to intend an agency that has been delegated express
authority to issue rules and express or implied authority to
decide individual cases, subject to a vague statutory standard, to
elaborate that standard by rule rather than by order, as soon as
feasible and to the extent practicable.' °
This default principle of statutory interpretation, backed by a norm of
judicial review consistent with the hard look doctrine, could work to
enhance agency lawmaking's promotion of deliberative democratic values.
Clearly, agency failure to use rulemaking is a pervasive problem, not
only at FERC but other agencies as well. While undermining, or perhaps
overruling, Chenery with a court-imposed interpretive norm seems a
radical solution, it is not without a strong normative basis. This
recommendation addresses concerns similar to those raised by the
constitutional scholars Professor Gerald Gunther and Professor John Ely,
as well as the economist and administrative law scholar Professor Susan
Rose-Ackerman.
Ely is concerned with reinforcing democratic
representation by adding a greater realism to judicial interpretation of
statutes."
Gunther argues that "safeguarding the structure of the
political process has been acknowledged as a major judicial obligation
287.
Id. at 283.
288.
id. at 284.
289.
See, e.g., Arthur E. Bonfield, The FederalAPA and State Administrative
Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 297 (1986); Arthur E. Bonfield, State Law in the Teaching of
Administrative Law: A CriticalAnalysis of the Status Quo, 61 TEx. L. REV. 95 (1982).
290.
Bonfield, Lawmaking Methodology, supra note 284, at 161.
291.
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 88, 101-04 (1980) (arguing
that a representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review is supportive of the
underlying premises of American democracy and involves tasks for which judges are
particularly well suited); id. at 125 (arguing that courts should help to improve the
visibility of the legislative process because "popular choice will mean little if we don't
know what are representatives are up to").
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since the 1930's."'
Rose-Ackerman proposes that courts review
regulatory statutes: 1) for internal consistency, requiring a statutory
statement of basis and purpose and consistency between this statement and
the body of the statute; 2) to determine if appropriations made under a
statute are adequate to carry out statutory purpose and, if not, to repeal
underfunded provisions; and 3) to give legal status to congressional rules
preventing the inclusion of substantive provisions in appropriations acts,
which permit statutes to be amended in invisible ways.'
RoseAckerman, like Ely and Gunther, does not envision judicial review as
mandating any particular procedure or substantive provision on the
legislature; rather, judicial review improves the transparency of the
legislative process by encouraging legislative deliberation and improving
voters' capacity to monitor congressional actions.
A default norm of statutory interpretation which favors rulemaking
where Congress has delegated discretion to an agency under a vague
statutory standard may have similar effects. Where rulemaking is not
desirable or is beyond an agency's capabilities, such a principle would
create incentives for an agency to lobby Congress for changes to
substantive law, either granting exceptions allowing the use of
adjudication or increasing agency resources for purposes of rulemaking.
The net results would be to provide a normatively preferable default
principle and, where the agency is unwilling or unable to comply, or
where special interests have convinced Congress that rulemaking is not
appropriate, to focus congressional attention and deliberation on agency
procedures. Special interests may be able to continue to secure their
choice of policymaking methodology at the agency, but not without
further congressional deliberation and publication. In a recent book,'
Cass Sunstein has argued that courts should revive norms of statutory
interpretation designed to promote constitutional purposes and the basic
goals of deliberative government. Perhaps it is useful to conceive of this
proposed principle as an addition to Sunstein's set of interpretive
principles for the regulatory state.
Nevertheless, I am inclined to reject this presumptive approach to
rulemaking, whether applied generally by Congress or by the courts.
While presumptive rulemaking would encourage deliberative democratic
government, it is not without high costs. First, because rulemaking is
generally more costly than adjudication, such a presumption might well
292.
Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REv. 1, 44 (1972); see also id. at 23 (requiring statutes to be a rational means

to a legitimate end).
293.
294.

ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 70, at 189-90.
See SUNSTEIN, supra note 119, at 111-59.
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deter agencies from making new policy. Second, such a presumption
ignores the necessity of agency discretion in implementing regulations:
no set of regulations is comprehensive enough to avoid adjudicative
applications that raise new legal and policy issues.
Thus, in order to
ensure deliberative democracy, alternative reforns are needed.
B. Increasing the Accountability and Deliberationof Adjudication
It would be preferrable that we focus on reforming adjudication
rather than rulemaking. Chenery recognized that case-by-case decisions
can create new standards of conduct which have precedential effect.2 '
FERC's reform of electricity regulation through ad hoe decisionmaking,
as discussed in this Article, exemplifies the emergence of precedent
through adjudication. The legal rules and policies developed in and
reinforced through adjudicative proceedings at FERC have had the same

practical effect as would rules promulgated through the formal or informal
processes of the APA. Professor Glen Robinson has argued that the
APA's distinction between rulemaking and adjudication is an arbitrary,

overly formalistic distinction which ignores the practical aspects of
regulation.'
The analysis of this Article would suggest that, at least
with respect to FERC, he is correct. Movement towards a competitively
structured electric utility industry appears irreversible. Although it would
be a propitious time for FERC to engage in rulemaking,298 FERC will

likely continue to bring competition to the industry by adopting legal- and
policy-oriented reforms in adjudicative contexts.
Thus, to the extent an agency is using adjudication to perform
generic rulemaking functions, courts should ensure that a participatory

and deliberative decisionmaking process has occurred by applying a hard
look doctrine to

adjudicative

proceedings.'

To

enhance

the

295.
It has been recognized, for example, that Order No. 636's success has been
guaranteed by the willingness of FERC and regulated parties to "bend the rules" and
allow flexibility in its implementation. See Energy Lawyers Told that Cooperationand
Rule-Bending Were Crucial Elements of Post-Order No. 636 Success So Far, FOSTER
NATURAL GAS REP., May 19, 1994, at 12. For discussion of the necessity of adjudicative
discretion in the implementation of PURPA's rules, see Rossi, supra note 16.
296.
332 U.S. at 202-03 ("Mhe agency must retain power to deal with the
problems on a case-by-case basis if the administrative process is to be effective. There
is thus a very definite place for the case-by-case evolution of statutory standards.").
297.
Glen 0. Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at
Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative ProcedureReform, 118 U. PA. L. REV.
485, 535-36 (1970).
298.
See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
299.
The D.C. Circuit has recently applied heightened scrutiny in the adjudicative
context to require further deliberation at the agency. Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v.
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compatibility of the pronouncement of policy in adjudication proceedings
with the will of the community at large, Congress should consider
amending existing substantive laws to require broader intervention rights
in agency adjudicative proceedings that make new law and policy, as well
as more liberal appeal of such adjudicative decisions. Hybrid procedures,

including generic adjudication inviting paper comments from parties,
could work to enhance participation. Notably absent from the judicial
review provisions of the APA or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
any serious mechanism for consolidating agency adjudicative cases on
appeal which have raised similar legal and policy issues over time so that
reviewing courts are able to evaluate the full precedential effect of the
agency's individual adjudicative decisions.
In addition to legislative modification, it would be appropriate for
courts to more aggressively review FERC's routine denial of interventions
in adjudicative proceedings likely to address legal and policy issues of
precedential effect.'
If, as I suppose, the rulemaking/adjudication
distinction is somewhat of a fiction in the FERC context, courts should
scrutinize more closely what the agency did in adjudicative proceedings,
not what the agency has chosen to call its actions. Adoption of such
mechanisms could clearly work to enhance the fairness and accountability
of adjudication in the context of FERC decisionmaking. 1

FERC, 28 F.3d 173 (1994) (per curiam) (remanding order approving transmission tariff
filing for FERC's failure to explain approval of standard investment provision).
300.
Under some existing FERC precedents, an interest that is based solely on the
possible precedential effect of the Commission's decision in a particular proceeding does
not constitute a sufficient interest to warrant intervenor status in that proceeding. See,
e.g., Northeast Util. Serv. Co., 53 F.E.R.C. 61,135, at 61,456 (1990). Recent cases,
particularly those addressing the scope of FERC's authority to order wholesale
transmission access, have allowed broader intervention. Florida Mun. Power Agency, 65
F.E.R.C. 61,125, at 61,612 (1993) (granting interventions in first proceeding addressing
request for a transmission order under FPA §§ 211, 212, as amended by the Energy
Policy Act, because the order "could have the effect of establishing binding precedent on
issues affecting the entire industry").
301.
Many of the reforms I have in mind echo Professor Susan Bandes' proposed
reforms for Article III case and controversy jurisprudence. Bandes views the federal
courts' current case and controversy jurisprudence as atomistic, assuming that a case is
an even controversy between private individuals for material stakes. This "private rights"
model leads to a refusal to recognize the cognizability of collective rights and collective
harms, as well as a contorted logic where courts desire to deviate from the private rights
model. Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REv. 227 (1990).
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VI. CODA

In this Article, I have described certain inaccuracies with the policyeffect account of judicial review's effects on the FERC. On the whole,
evidence of judicial review's effects on FERC's policy choices is
ambiguous, at best. FERC has made many of its choices in the
adjudicative context, perhaps in part due to reviewing court application
of the hard look doctrine, but also, I would argue, due to statutory
constraints on FERC's discretion, structural problems unique to the
electricity industry, and a concern for transition costs. Moreover, FERC
has been able to muster the political courage to complete restructuring
rulemakings in the natural gas context and, in 1993, to commence several
rulemakings and generic policy inquiries in the electric utility context.
Now would be a propitious time for FERC to continue these efforts.
This Article has also attempted to redeem judicial review as a
protector of deliberative democratic values from the myopic antimajoritarian role its critics have given it. Deliberative democracy, with
its emphasis on increased citizen participation and deliberative
government, envisions an active role for the judiciary in reviewing the
exercise of agency discretion.
Where Congress has delegated
decisionmaking discretion to administrative agencies, judicial review is
more adept at protecting these values than controls such as legislative or
executive oversight.
Taken together, the descriptive and normative strands of this Article
should help to construct a more accurate and complete understanding of
judicial review, its adverse effects, and its virtues in the energy context.
Although it is difficult to isolate the effects of judicial review on any
agency's policy choices, in the FERC context there is some indirect
evidence that judicial review may have caused FERC to exhaust many of
its resources in adjudicative proceedings, rather than make generic policy
through rulemaking, as a weak version of the policy-effect thesis would
suggest. This alone should not lead us to constrict judicial review, I have
argued, for reforms to adjudication may work to enhance deliberative
democratic values in ways compatible with judicial review.
Before concluding, I should respond briefly to two objections that
might be raised to the approach I have taken in this Article. One might,
first, accuse me of being an apologist for FERC's recent policy choices.
While I have identified many desirable reforms voluntarily initiated by
FERC, I do not believe that FERC has gone as far as it can or should in
reforming the electric utility industry. By describing what FERC has
done in recent years, I hope that I have not suggested that I agree with all
of these reforms. My only purpose in describing these reforms has been
to revisit the policy-effect account, first presented by Pierce in the energy
context, and to understand how the choices available to FERC may differ
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from choices available to other agencies, such as EPA, OSHA, or
NHTSA.
A second objection is that one might characterize the deliberative
democratic defense of judicial review as "court-based," trivializing the
roles of the legislature and executive. The theory I have presented,
however, should not be taken to suggest that courts have the ability or
power to seek out the common values of the general polity and to
implement them. At best, courts provide only a partial delineation of
these values. But more important is the contribution of courts to political
conversation: the primary role of courts is in assuring the expression of
these values through more accountable and deliberative institutions.
Within the theory I have presented, the traditional legislative and
executive branches, as well as administrative agencies, remain active in
decisionmaking processes.
The account of judicial review I have presented differs in some
respects from the classical administrative law approach, which attempts
to understand the role of judicial review as merely controlling agency
policymaking discretion. As an alternative to this traditional vision, I
have tried to present an account of the hard look doctrine that
contemplates a partnership role for courts with Congress and agencies in
promoting legitimacy, or what one commentator has called "sound
governance. " ' Within this account, judicial review does not exist in
isolation to be evaluated with respect to its impact upon the agency;
rather, judicial review is viewed as a part of an ongoing political
conversation that aims to reconcile implementation of the value of
technical expertise with the normative dimensions of democracy. Recent
comparative legal scholars have noted the normative problems with a
weak judiciary and broad deference to agency decisionmaking in countries
such as Germany and South Africa.' Perhaps American administrative
law scholars could benefit from tempering their descriptive accounts of
judicial review's adverse effects with a similar dose of normativity.
Cautious, comprehensive case-by-case studies of judicial review's
302.
In a recent book, Professor Christopher Edley presents a theory of judicial
review designed to promote "sound governance," a shift from the predominant "control
of discretion" paradigm in administrative law.
CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 213-14
(1990). Edley's account, however, is rather vague about what sound governance entails.
303.
DAVID DYZENHAUS, HARD CASES IN WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS: SOUTH
AFRICAN LAW IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 257-70 (1991) (using case
study of deferential review of executive actions by South African judges to defend judicial
review in the British administrative law context against its critics); Susan Rose-Ackerman,
American Administrative Law Under Siege: Is Germany a Model?, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1279 (1994) (noting sacrifice of democratic value in German public law model, which is
highly deferential to agency decisions).
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practices, problems, and virtues might support the policy-effect assault on
judicial review, but they may just as well have a sobering effect on those
who would curtail the judiciary's role in the administrative state.

